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A fair value of 92€ was found for the BMW group, representing 
the success of the implementation of the strategy number ONE 
together with the exceptional performance of the BMW group 
over the last few years. Even considering all the risks the 
company is facing and the strong investments expected to be 
made, the stock price found on this valuation reflected a current 
undervaluation in the market and therefore we issue a buy 
recommendation on BMW stock.  
LEADING OVER THE YEARS 
The BMW group is one of the largest car manufacturers in the 
world. It currently owns three very well positioned brands: 
BMW, Mini and Rolls Royce. Through each one of the brands, 
the group tries to have a different goal and transmit a different 
idea. Nevertheless, they all share the quality and luxury that 
strongly characterizes the company. The BMW group was 
founded in 1917 and has been growing strongly since then. 
Nowadays, it has strong market position in all of its three 
revenue segments. Even with the automobile segment 
representing the highest source of revenue, the company also 
has a strong market position in the motorcycle segment and 
operates a successful financial services business, by being leader 
in all of them. In 2012, BMW sold more than 1.84 million 
BMW, Mini and Rolls Royce vehicles, which represented an 
increase in revenues of about 10% in comparison to the previous 
year. Profit before tax and net profit of the group also registered 
record figures in 2012. Over the last years, the BMW group has 
been expanding to many different countries and is now more 
international than ever, with 29 production facilities in 14 
different countries by the end of 2012. 
Recommendation: 
BUY 
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TABLE 1 – BMW GROUP IN FIGURES (IN € MILLION)  
Source: Company reports and own calculations 
 
BEATING THE MARKET 
Even with the debt crisis strongly affecting the segments where 
BMW operates, the company was able to beat the market and 
continue to generate profits and be on top. BMW stock price 
has been performing very well along the years and registered its 
high momentum, until the date of the valuation, in October 
2012, by being valued in the market at 83€. Even after that date, 





Source:  Company reports, Bloomberg and own calculations 
Upon analysis of the German stock index, the DAX 40, we can 




Capital Expenditure 6.346 





Profit Before Tax 5.824 
Income Taxes 2.039 
Net profit/loss for the year 3.758 
 









Cost of Debt 3,1% 
Cost of Equity 7,7% 









Source: Company Reports, Bloomberg 
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the high volatility felt all over the world and even so its share price increased, most of the times, in a 
higher scale than the reference index.  
Graphic 2 - Development of BMW stock and DAX 40 index returns 
 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
 
INVESTING STRONGLY 
This extremely good performance is primarily the result of the strategy number ONE 
implementation, through which BMW has been taking long-term and future-oriented decisions. 
During the next few years, BMW is expected to develop a huge variety of new models, by putting 
electro mobility on the road, which will need intensive investments in new and innovative raw-
materials as well as the development of new production facilities. Given this, it is expected that the 
firm will register huge capital expenditures, especially in 2013 and 2014. Thus BMW is trying to set 
new standards of resource conservation by launching, for example, BMWi3, a solution for 
emissions-free driving and to lower fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. Moreover, the political 
uncertainties regarding conflicts in the Middle East kept the price of Brent oil and the energy prices 
at huge levels. Those are one of the most important ones in Europe, which will also mean an increase 
in raw material prices for the BMW group. The Brent oil is an important basic material for 
production and a change in the price of oil also leads to a change in fuel prices, which is dangerous 
regarding the purchasing power of customers. In addition, a sharp increase in the price of crude oil 
may affect the world economy and international capital markets as a whole, and as such also affect 



























































































































































































                Equity Valuation of the BMW Group 
 
4 
FACING THE MARKET RISKS 
Exchange rates also remain volatile and given that more than half of BMW’s total revenue comes 
from sales outside the euro zone, this also represents a risk that the company should be aware of. 
Nevertheless, in 2012 the Chinese renminbi and the US dollar remained practically unchanged on a 
year-end comparison. In order to try to eliminate the risk that foreign currencies depreciate against 
the euro, BMW tries to hedge its currency exposure through ‘’natural hedging’’, by rising the 
volume of local production and purchases denominated in foreign currency, and through financial 
hedging on the financial markets. Asia and America were also the regions where BMW registered its 
higher increase in demand in 2012, with the second one providing its strongest momentum. On the 
other hand, in Europe the demand for car registrations has been decreasing. Even so, the decrease in 
Germany was less pronounced, which was good news for BMW given its senior presence in this 
particular country. As for the motorcycle segments and financial services market, Europe was also 
where the crisis effects were more prominent and where the company revenues contracted more. 
However, increases in the USA, Brazil, Germany and Japan more than justified the double digit 
growth that the group achieved.  
VALUATION OUTPUT 
This report is based on the investigation of all the public information and pays particular attention to 
the huge impact that the next few years changes will have on the company share price, given the high 
injection of capital from the group and the strong profitability that has been registered. By making 
the most accurate assumptions possible about BMW’s operations, the valuation was carried out by 
means of three different methodologies: the Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) and the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) approach, the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) and the Relative 











The present dissertation aims to value the BMW group, which currently owns three different and 
physically powerful brands: BMW, Mini and Rolls Royce. There is still much deliberation among 
analysts about which valuation method is the most accurate, but almost all investors agree that the 
Discounted Cash Flow is one of the best models to use. Therefore, the BMW group will be valued 
with this method, as well as with a relative valuation which is extremely important fundamentally as 
a complementary tool for the DCF. The Dividend Discount Model was also used in order to value the 
price per share based on the present value of future dividends. 
The results obtained with these methodologies will be compared with the ones of an investment bank 
– JP Morgan, published in 2013. This has been done in order to understand the main differences on 
the valuation and to provide a way of checking its strength. Therefore, given the exceptional period 
that the BMW group is undergoing, we find that the current value of BMW is in fact undervalued 


















This dissertation faced me with a lot of crucial concepts regarding equity valuation and valuable 
inputs to my future from now on.  
Luckily, I had a great amount of help during this process which was essential to the improvement of 
this work. Firstly, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor José Tudela Martins, for the invaluable 
help and for his immediate support in clarifying my doubts during the whole process. Furthermore, a 
mention to Miss Andreas Stoeffler, from the investor relationships’ department of the BMW group, 
who was also highly cooperative in responding to my e-mails and giving me precious inputs, 
fundamentally for my forecasts of the company. Finally, I also want to thank all of my colleagues for 
providing me with constructive inputs and suggestions of improvement and for all the support from 

















                Equity Valuation of the BMW Group 
 
7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 10 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 11 
2.1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 11 
2.2. VALUATION FRAMEWORKS ................................................................................................. 11 
2.2.1. THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOWS METHOD .............................................................. 11 
2.2.2. ADJUSTED PRESENT VALUE METHOD ..................................................................... 13 
2.2.3. RELATIVE VALUATION ................................................................................................. 14 
2.2.4. OPTION PRICING MODEL............................................................................................... 17 
2.2.5. DIVIDEND DISCOUNT MODEL ..................................................................................... 18 
2.2.6. ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED METHOD ........................................................................ 19 
2.2.7. ECONOMIC PROFIT METHOD ....................................................................................... 20 
2.2.8. VALUATION IN EMERGING MARKETS ...................................................................... 21 
2.3. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS .......................................................................................... 22 
2.3.1. TERMINAL VALUE ........................................................................................................... 22 
2.3.2. PRESENT VALUE OF THE INTEREST TAX SHIELDS .............................................. 22 
2.3.3. RISK PREMIUM ................................................................................................................. 23 
2.3.4. LEVERED AND UNLEVERED BETA ............................................................................. 24 
2.3.5. COST OF EQUITY .............................................................................................................. 25 
2.3.6. COST OF DEBT .................................................................................................................. 25 
2.3.7. FREE CASH FLOW TO THE FIRM (FCFF) AND FREE CASH FLOW TO THE 
EQUITY (FCFE) .................................................................................................................................. 26 
3. COMPANY’S PRESENTATION ........................................................................................................... 27 
4. GENERAL ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................................ 30 
4.1. INDUSTRY OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... 30 
4.2. THE BMW GROUP OVERVIEW .............................................................................................. 31 
4.2.1. AUTOMOBILES SEGMENT ............................................................................................. 31 
4.2.2. MOTORCYCLES SEGMENT ............................................................................................ 32 
4.2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES SEGMENT ................................................................................ 33 
                Equity Valuation of the BMW Group 
 
8 
5. COMPANY’S VALUATION ................................................................................................................. 34 
5.1. DCF VALUATION ...................................................................................................................... 34 
5.1.1. VALUATION ISSUES ........................................................................................................ 35 
5.1.1.1. BMW’S REVENUES ...................................................................................................... 35 
5.1.1.1.1. AUTOMOBILES SEGMENT .................................................................................. 35 
5.1.1.1.2. MOTORCYCLES SEGMENT ................................................................................. 36 
5.1.1.1.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES SEGMENT ..................................................................... 36 
5.1.1.2. BMW’S COST OF SALES ............................................................................................. 36 
5.1.1.2.1. AUTOMOBILES SEGMENT .................................................................................. 37 
5.1.1.2.2. MOTORCYCLES SEGMENT ................................................................................. 37 
5.1.1.2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES SEGMENT ..................................................................... 38 
5.1.1.3. SELLING AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ............................................................. 38 
5.1.1.4. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES ............................................ 39 
5.1.1.5. OTHER OPERATING INCOME AND EXPENSES .................................................... 40 
5.1.1.6. INTEREST EXPENSES AND INCOME ....................................................................... 40 
5.1.1.7. RESULTS FROM EQUITY ACCOUNTED INVESTMENTS .................................... 40 
5.1.1.8. OTHER FINANCIAL RESULT ..................................................................................... 40 
5.1.1.9. INCOME TAXES ............................................................................................................ 40 
5.1.2. FREE CASH FLOW TO THE FIRM ................................................................................. 41 
5.1.2.1. DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION .................................................................. 41 
5.1.2.2. PROVISIONS ................................................................................................................... 42 
5.1.2.3. INVESTMENT IN WORKING CAPITAL .................................................................... 42 
5.1.2.4. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES .......................................................................................... 42 
5.1.3. WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL (WACC) ................................................ 43 
5.1.3.1. CAPITAL STRUCTURE ................................................................................................ 44 
5.1.3.2. COST OF EQUITY .......................................................................................................... 45 
5.1.3.3. RISK FREE RATE ........................................................................................................... 46 
5.1.3.4. MARKET RISK PREMIUM ........................................................................................... 46 
5.1.3.5. BETA ................................................................................................................................ 47 
                Equity Valuation of the BMW Group 
 
9 
5.1.3.6. COST OF DEBT .............................................................................................................. 47 
5.1.4. OUTPUT OF THE VALUATION ...................................................................................... 48 
5.2. DIVIDEND DISCOUNT MODEL ............................................................................................. 49 
5.3. RELATIVE VALUATION ......................................................................................................... 50 
5.3.1. PEER GROUP ...................................................................................................................... 50 
5.3.2. THE MULTIPLES APPROACH ........................................................................................ 52 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................... 54 
7. THE VALUE AT RISK ........................................................................................................................... 55 
8. RESEARCH REPORT COMPARISON ................................................................................................ 57 
9. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 60 
10. APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................................... 62 
10.1. FORECASTED INCOME STATEMENT FROM 2011 TO 2017 (IN € MILLION) ............. 62 
10.2. FREE CASH FLOW TO THE FIRM (IN € MILLION) ........................................................... 64 
10.2. DCF VALUATION OUTPUT (IN € MILLION) ...................................................................... 65 
10.3. EPS CALCULATION (IN € MILLION, EXCEPT FOR PRICES AND EPS) ....................... 65 
10.4. DDM VALUATION OUTPUT ................................................................................................... 66 
10.5. BMW’S BONDS OUTSTANDING ........................................................................................... 66 
10.6. PEER GROUP DEFINITION WITH CENTROIDS ................................................................. 67 
10.7. MULTIPLES VALUATION ....................................................................................................... 68 
10.8. INFLATION AND REAL GDP FORECASTS ......................................................................... 68 
10.9. BMW AG RATING HISTORY .................................................................................................. 69 
10.10. 10-YEAR GERMAN BOND EVOLUTION .......................................................................... 69 
11. ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................ 70 
12. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................ 71 
12.1. BOOKS ......................................................................................................................................... 71 
12.2. ARTICLES ................................................................................................................................... 71 
12.3. SEMINAR MATERIAL .............................................................................................................. 73 
12.4. WEBSITES ................................................................................................................................... 73 
12.5. OTHER SOURCES ...................................................................................................................... 73 




In order to access if a company is performing well or not, valuation is the key. Nowadays, it plays a 
central role in a large amount of finance jobs. Additionally, it’s the key to understand what to expect 
from a given company in the near future in terms of its stock development or if it’s valuable or not to 
investment in that company, according to the overvaluation or undervaluation of that particular 
stock. Plus, in cases of mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures, for example, it’s important to 
value the synergies of those companies. Therefore, valuation plays not just a finance role but also a 
strategic one.  
In order to accomplish my objective of valuing the BMW group, one needs to access a lot of relevant 
articles on this topic with the aim of being aware of the different consensus among analysts regarding 
this. Currently, there’s huge discussion in the literature about which model provides the most reliable 
results, although they all give applicable inputs in order to choose the model that is more adequate to 
the company characteristics and the market where it is inserted. Given this, the first part of this 
dissertation includes a review of these published articles.  
Afterwards, the valuation methods that were chosen were implemented so as to reach a final stock 
value for the BMW group, which is a public company that had registered its most exceptional year in 
2012 and has been growing since ever, even when almost all the other companies in the same 
industry are suffering from the economic downturn. That valuation was done with three different 
methods in order to check the quality and reliability of the valuation. Then, DCF/WACC approach, 
Multiples and DDM were the methods chosen to value the group.  
Once the valuation was done, a sensitivity analysis was conducted in order to catch the impacts that 
the future risk and uncertainties on the market can have on the company’s value and share price.  
The last step was to reach a final value per share and compare it to the target value achieved from an 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
‘’Behind every major resource-allocation decision a company makes lies some calculation of what 
that move is worth’’ 
- Luerhman 1997 
The variety of different approaches available to value a company originate a lot of discussions about 
which one seems to provide the most accurate results. One consensus of all financial experts on this 
topic is the fact that all valuations produce the same results if they are all under the same 
assumptions. Nowadays, valuation should be present in almost all kind of decisions that managers 
need to face. Either when launching a new product or an entering a strategic partnership, managers 
who are not finance specialists need to be prepared to carry out those valuations in order to be 
present in the company’s resource allocation decisions (Luerhman 1997).  
Luehrman (1997) claims that all valuations are a function of cash, timing and risk. Nevertheless, 
each different problem needs different valuations and the right methodology should be the one 
adpated to the structural features and major kinds of decisions that managers face (Luehrman 1997). 
Young et al. (1999) defend that when making a specific valuation, companies shouldn’t use a great 
number of different methods, since the more approaches companies use, the weaker the final 
message is. Then, it becames hard to understand which approach provides the most reliable result. 
The previous authors algo argue that all valuation models should be mathematically equivalent, and 
managers should be able to express a valuation based on discounted cash flows in terms of P/Es, for 
example. According to Young et al. (1999), managers need to have in mind four basic implications 
before carrying out any kind of valuation: consistency of the data and of the assumptions; 
comparison between models; uniqueness of the one single fair value estimation and, lastly, 
consistency without uniformity, in which all analysts should be free to decide about the valuation 
approach to use.  
2.2. VALUATION FRAMEWORKS 
 
2.2.1. THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOWS METHOD 
A discounted cash flow valuation regards business as a series of risky cash flows and assumes that 
the value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows of that assets, discounted at a risk 
that reflects the risk of those cash flows.  


















E (   ) = Expected Cash Flow in period t 
r = discount rate reflecting riskiness of estimated cash flows 
n = Life period of asset 
It is then expected that the value of the assets with lots of predictable cash flows should be higher 
than the ones with low and volatile cash flows (Damodaran 2002). Valuations based on the DCF 
method are discounted at one unique discount rate, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), 
which should catch up all the cost and benefits of a specific capital strucure (Luehrman 1997).  
2. WACC = 
 
   
   ( - )  
 
   
   
Then, the cash flows will vary from assets to assets according to the dividends the company pays, the 
stocks it has, the interest it pays, the face value of bonds and the after-tax cash flows for a business 
(Damodaran 2002). Therefore, the value of interest tax shields is picked up on this tax-adjustment. 
Nevertheless, the value of those interes tax shields are based on fairly restrictive assumptions. 
Further, Luerhman (1997) argues that both the cost of debt and cost of equity are opportunity costs, 
each one reflecting the time value and its own risk premium. 
Nowadays, there also many discussions among analysts about the advantages and limitations of this 
approach. An opinion shared by everyone is that there are now a lot more methods better tailored for 
specific operations and problems that managers have to face. Although, the DCF stills continues to 
work well in a range of cases and it has the large advantage of being standard and simple to use.  
First of all, DCF requires analysts to understand the all business they are valuing, which obliges them 
to study the sustainability of cash flows and risk (Damodaran 2002). In addition, it obliges analysts 
to look for the essentials that drive the value and not the market perceptions about it. As a result, it is 
easy to find stocks that are undervalued or overvalued just by understanding if stock prices fall or 
rise, respectively, disproportionately to the earnings and cash flows (Damodaran 2002). 
On the opposite side, there are some limitations related to the DCF methodology. Firstly, this 
approach should be applied in companies whithout complex capital structures, tax positions or fund-
raising strategies, because those are the circumstances were mistakes are more easy to be made 
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within this methodoly (Luerhman 1997). Estimations based on this methodology have the risk of 
misscalculation of WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital). The problem is that those conditions 
are not exactly common nowadays. In most real cases, the WACC needs to be adjusted for all the 
effects of a specific financing program, like tax shields, issue costs, subsidies hedges, exotic debt 
securities or dynamic capital structures (Luerhman 1997). On the other hand, if a company has a 
constant debt to equity ratio over the long run, the DCF methodologymay be used accurately. 
Fernández (2013) argues that the WACC is a weighted average of two different aspects: the cost of 
debt (which translates the cost) and a required return (which can either translate a cost or a return). 
The second one is usually called the required return on debt, although that is not always a return but 
also a cost, sometimes. Therefore Fernández (2013) defends that calling the WACC as “cost of 
capital’’ is not accurate. Besides that, Luerhman (1997) presents the fact that most analysts neglect 
costs of financial distress associated with corporate levarage and consequently ignore other 
interesting financial side effects.  
Another problem with this approach is that some analysts use book values to generate the weights in 
the WACC, whereas the procedure is valid only for market values (Luerhman 1997). Fernández 
(2003) also shares this argument. Damodaran (2002) states that the use of the DCF approach can be 
considered an act of faith. This is because one is expecting that every asset has an intrinsic value 
which is calculated by looking at the company’s fundamentals. Another drawback associated with 
DCF is that any analyst has access to all the information necessary to some kinds of assumptions. 
There is always private information that can distort the assumptions that have been made based on 
public information. Consequently, Damodaran (2002) defends that the intrinsic value used is never 
actually the true intrinsic value.  
2.2.2. ADJUSTED PRESENT VALUE METHOD 
Over the past years, it has  usually been argued that Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) methodology was 
the best practice for valuing operating asseets. Nowadays, some authors tend to disagree with that.  
Luehrman (1997) defend that DCF is now an obsolete methodology and that the Adjusted Present 
Value (APV) is especially versatile and reliable, stating that the DCF is still taught in schools and 
books but that is because it is standard and not the best methodology to use. They are, however, two 
different methodologies used with the same purpose: to evaluate any existing asset that will generate 
future cash flows. 
                Equity Valuation of the BMW Group 
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The first benefit of using the APV approach is that it always works when WACC does, and 
sometimes it also works when WACC doesn’t.  The rationale for that is the fact that APV requires 
less restrictive assumptions. Besides that, APV is less prone to serious errors than WACC 
(Luehrman 1997).  
The way  in how managers account for the value created or destroyed is where the difference 
between both methodologies come from. The fundamental idea under the use of the APV method is 
the results it provides. It gives the managers more information than the DCF, providing not only the 
final value of the valuation, but also the distinction of where the different parts of the value came 
from. The APV methodology evaluate financial maneuvers separately and then add that value to 
that of the business. Therefore, the effects on value of debt financiang are separated from the ones 
of assets financing. In terms of calculation, it aims to value the business as if it were 100% equity 
financing and then adding the present value of the tax benefits of debt and take away the expected 
bankruptcy costs (Damodaran 2002). 
3. APV = Value of the project ad if it were financed entirely with equity + Value of all financial 
side effects 
While in the DCF approach the value of debt is captured in the discount rate, the APV approach 
estimates the benefits and costs of debt, not linking it to the assets of the business (Damodaran 
2002).  
On the one hand, debt financing creates tax advantages because interest payments are tax-deductible. 
On the other hand, it also increases bankruptcy costs. In the past, the APV had some limitations 
compared to the DCF methodology, since the second one simply requires one discounting operation 
(Luerhman 1997) which facilitates the process. Nonetheless, the development of new technologies 
and speed spreadsheets prepared to perform those kinds of calculations exceeded that facility.  
Currently, any company that is not prepared to use spreadsheets for valuation is far behind the times.  
Another advantage of this approach is that fact that it is flexible. The company can organize the 
valuation according to what makes more sense for them (Luerhman 1997). However, not all the 
characteristics of this approach are that beneficial. One of the problems with the APV is that it is not 
an easy task to estimate probabilities of default and bankruptcy costs (Damodaran 2002), which leads 
lots of investors to ignore that part of the calculation. Because of that, analysts tend to consider only 
the benefits of debt on the valuation, which makes them conclude that the firm value increases as 
they borrow money.  It indicates that the optimal debt ratio for a firm is 100%. That is why the APV 
approach is more appropriate when firms are analysing debt proportions, while the DCF considers 
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that the debt ratio of the firm remains constant over time. Damodaran (2002) states that when trying 
to determine the debt ratio of the firm, one should look at the levarage of similar firms in the industry 
in which the firm operates. 
2.2.3. RELATIVE VALUATION 
Multiples are one of the most straightforward methods when it comes to interpreting results and 
drawing conclusions. Their aim is to help companies understand their positioning compared to the 
competition and therefore be able to adapt strategically and create more value. They are similarly 
very easy to use. Analysts usually calculate an industry average Price-to-Earnings Ratio (PER) to 
multiply it by the company’s expected earnings in order to achieve a specific forecast for the 
valuation, when using the PER. Similarly, enterprise value equals trend free cash flow divided by the 
average free cash flow yield, when applying this appoach to yields. This approach is followed by 
Young et al. (1999) stating that the use of multiples should be based on a trend rather than actual 
profits.  
The simplicity of using this approach resides in the fact that it needs much less restrictive 
assumptions than Discounted Cash Flows or Adjusted Present Value do. That is why Fernández 
(2002) supports that the valuation by multiples shouldn’t be carried out on its own. When investors 
decide to use this valuation approach, it is preferable to compare the results with another valuation 
method, like DCF. 
Liu et al. (2002) show that the use of more complex measures of intrinsic value, for example, doesn’t 
improve performance. That is explained as a surpass of the multiples benefit. They are used because 
they are simple and intuitive, which makes the practice of including complex restrictions pointless. 
Nevertheless, the use of this methodologyshould be cautelous, since multiples present some 
limitations. One of the problems associated with multiples is that, most of the times, they are not 
correctly applied and drivers such as company’s return on invested capital (ROIC), growth rate or 
weighted average cost of capital are misapplied (Goedhart et al. 2005).  Nevertheless, not all 
companies, even in the same industry, have equivalent figures. For example, growth rates, costs of 
capital or even the capital structure can be completely diverse. These dissimilarities lead to one of 
the biggest problems of using multiples, which come about when analysts have to decide which 
companies are truly comparable. This also one of the most important decisions and, at the same 
time,the most difficult part when making this kind of valuation, seeing that an incorrect definition of 
the peer group can lead to completely pointless valuations.  
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One must look at indicators like profitability, growth rate, capital structure, cost of capital and also to 
choose companies whitin the same market and business segment. The fact that not all investors have 
the same expectations about the company’s ongoing activity and therefore on its ability to create 
value make the selection of comparable companies extremely cumbersome. Therefore, Goedhart et 
al. (2005) discuss that one has to match those with similar expectations for growth and ROIC. Liu et 
al. (2002) argue that selecting firms from the same industry improves the realibility of the valuation 
results. Foushee et al. (2012) agree by saying that peers should compete in the same markets and be 
subject to the same macroeconomic events. On the other hand, Damodaran (2002) defends that 
comparable companies should present similar cash flows, potential growth and risk.  
Another problem associated with the multiples valuations is that there are a lot of different multiples 
and different ones lead to inconsistent conclusions (Goedhart et al., 2003). What's more is that if 
they’re used in different contexts, they can be absolutely meaningful. Damodaran (2002) also 
defends that they are depended on the way the market is valuing these firms, since it’s based on how 
good the market was in pricing the company and in determing if it is overvalued or undervalued, for 
example.  
Goedhart et al. (2003) state that companies should have in mind four basic principles when using 
multiples: the use of peers with similar ROIC and growth rate, the use of forward-looking multiples 
and of entreprise-value multiples and lastly, the adjustment of enterprise-value multiples for non-
operating items.  
Another drawback associated is the fact they they are static as they value the firm at that specific 
point, which fails to capture future events and the competition dynamics. Liu et al. (2002) also 
defend that multiples based on forward earnings are more accurate in explaining stock prices. The 
most commonly used ones are the PER (price-to-earnings ratio) and the Entreprise-Value Multiples. 
The PER is even more frequently used, since it takes into account risk and EPS growth. Furthermore, 
it is the easiest to use for the majority of companies and it links company value to profit.  It also 
depends on information which is widely available and easy to acess. Moreover, some investigations 
have shown that prices provide information about earnings ahead of time and that those earnings 
capture the effect on prices of macroeconomic events. Beaver et al. (1978) have shown that PER  
ratios not only predict future earnings changes but they also recognize temporary aspects of current 
earnings.  
On a different point of view, Goedhart et al. (2005) defend that PER is misleading, since non-
recurring and non-operating items are frequently set in the earnings figures. Besides that, it is based 
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on earnings and consequently on equity, which lead them to be extremely sensitive to the capital 
structure of the companies.  
The Price-to-earnings Ratio should be computed as follows (Fernández 2001): 
4. Price Earnings Ratio (PER) = 
                   
   
 = 
                     
               
                       
 
The second most common multiples are the ones based on Enterprise Values. This is less susceptible 
to changes in the debt ratio of the companies than the second one, according to Goedhart et al. 
(2003). When PER is difficult to use because of accounting policies or negative earnings, usually 
analysts use enterprise value multiples. However, Fernández (2001) states that these multiples are  
non inclusive of variations in working capital requirements, nor considering capital investments.  
Moreover, Liu et al. (2002) showed that adjusted EBITDA performs better than EBIT and sales. 

















2.2.4. OPTION PRICING MODEL 
Recently, the need to value listed options, assets, businesses and equity stakes in businesses has 
made analysts  use option princing models instead of DCF valuation (Damodaran 2002). There is 
also the case in which one wants to know how to value the invesment in R&D or in which kind of 
R&D to invest. In this case, they are valuing opportunities (Luerhman 1997). The basics with that 
investment is that one is spending now and the payoffs of that investment only come later.  
How companies typically evaluate opportunities is to use a DCF based approach but evaluating 
strategic projects with special rules. That rule tends to compensate the tendency of DCF to 
undervalue strategic options by discounting them at a lower hurdle rate than routine investments 
(Luerhman 1997). Damodaran shares this opinion by saying that DCF models value assets based on a 
set of expected cash flows, not considering the fact that firms might learn something from real-time 
developments and respond to that learning. 
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Luerhman (1997) highlights the fact that the ideal decision is based on to do what is best when the 
time comes. That’s because one is depending on how things look now and in the future. Damodaran 
(2002) agrees and states that ones has to be very careful when valuing real options. Luerhman (1997) 
also presents the similiarity between an opportunity and an option, by saying that with an option one 
has the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell something at a specific date and with a specific 
price. With opportunities, one wants to invest when that specific opportunity proves to be valid. 
Therefore, the action of exercising an option when the price goes up is similar to the investment in an 
opportunity that appears to be valuable.  
Damodaran (2002) states that option pricing models are very useful because there are a lot of assets 
whose value depends on the characteristics of options and that couldn’t be valued conventionally. 
Besides that, this approach offers more reliable estimates for the value of an asset when there is a 
significant benefit associated with learning or flexibility. Nevertheless, it is not all advantageous. The 
value that comes from learning from what happens over time is really valuable if this learning is not 
picked up by our competitors as well and if they do not adpat their behaviour as well (Damodaran 
2002).  
Luerhman (1997) argues that the use of pricing models should be a complement, not a replacement. 
That means that another valuation methodology should have been used before. He defends that the 
Black-Scholes option pricing model is its favourite applicant because it shares some inputs with the 
DCF models and then can be used as a match of that. Despite the fact that it is not very easy to learn, 
it is widely available in commercial software, which means that the computer can price the option for 
you if you give it the necessary inputs. Morover, Luerhman (1997) states that the most difficult part 
about the use of option pricing models relies on its application to corporate problems as opposite to 
simples puts and calls. Additionally, the author argues that this approach is costlier but requires more 
time to learn, as well as being less intuitive. 
2.2.5. DIVIDEND DISCOUNT MODEL 
When making important decisions about whether or not to participate in a joint venture, strategic 
alliances, partnerships or the large proportions’ investments using project financing, companies are 
sharing ownership of their stakes with other parties. Therefore, managers need to value not only the 
project as a whole but also their company’s interest in it (Luerhman 1997).  
The Equity Cash Flow (ECF) approach is a way of valuing a company’s equity. Consequently, the 
cash flows are discounted at a rate that compensate the company for bearing a specific risk. Every 
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manager that is able to do a DCF approach is able to do a ECF approach, as well. Moreover, 
Luerhman (1997) states that the ECF is a more specialized valuation method than the APV or option 
pricing, since it adresses more specific assumptions and requires more inputs from corporate finance. 
This methodology, when considering only dividends as cash flows to equity, is called the Dividend 
Discount Model (DDM), which is the oldest discounted cash flow model. This approach is based on 
the underlying principle that when investors buy stock from listed companies, they expect to get 
dividends during the holding period and an expected price at the end of that period (Damodaran 
2002).  
The cash flows for equities are generally dividends and its risk relies on the timing and growth of the 
firm’s earnings and on its ability to pay dividends (Foerster et al. 2005). According to Damodaran 
(2005) there are two different ways of using this model, depending on the growth perspectives: 
Stable Growth Model: P0  
E (DPS)
ke- Expected  rowth in Perpetuity
 





t 1  + 
E (DPSn 1)
ke-Expected  rowth in Perpetuity
(1  ke)
n  
The two basics necessary to use this model are the expected dividends and the cost of equity. To 
obtain the first one, one should make assumptions about future growth rates in earnings and payout 
ratios, while the second one illustrates the required rate of return on a stock and is determined by its 
riskiness.  
Farrell (1985) says that the DDM is an essencial model for determining the attractiveness of 
individual stocks as well as attractiveness of the stock market where that stock belongs. Besides that, 
this approach has the advantage of helping to understand how the risk factors such as interest rate 
variations and changing inflation rates affect stocks (Farrel, 1985).  
Foerster et al. (2005) suggested that dividends constituted the majority of the total return received by 
investor over the past century. They found that the DDM and Gordon Growth are the two most 
accurate valuation methods at explaining the stock price of a firm that has been paying dividends 
over a long-period. Damodaran (2002) remembers that the Gordon Growth model is very simple and 
powerful. However, it is limited to firms that are growing at a stable rate. Given the volatility of 
earnings, that is a difficult assumption to be made. Nevertheless, if the payout ratio is adjusted to 
reflect changes in the expected growth rate, this model can be used accurately (Damodaran 2002). 
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Moreover, he argues that even a growing firm paying no dividends can be valued on the dividends 
that this company expects to pay out when the growth rate declines. Foerster et al. (2005) argue that 
this is especially true when using the full history of market returns in the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to estimate the discount rate.  
2.2.6. ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED METHOD 
The Economic Value Added (EVA) approach is based on the measure of the excess value that is 
created on an investment, given by the difference between the after-tax operating income (adjusted 
for operating leases, R&D and one-time events) and the WACC, at market values, times the book 
value of debt and equity of the previous period (Damodaran 2005). 
Of all the conflicts of interest there may be in company and among all its stakeholders, the EVA 
approach tends to especially emphasize the interest of the owners, given that the latter expect a 
maximum reward over the cost of capital invested in the firm.  
Salmi et al. (2001) showed that the EVA is very sensitive to its cost of equity constituent but it is 
insensitive to its cost of debt part, under regular conditions. Furthermore,  growth policies or 
leverage effects seem to strongly affect the result whithin this metholodgy. Therefore, when using 
this method one has to be very careful about the management  policies and external economic 
factors.  
Young et al. (1999) stated that EVA is a rearrangement of Discounted Cash Flow and that we can be 
precise about the EVA fair value estimation, altought we can not be precise about the detalais that 
make up that estimate. Plus, this approach has some data issues with financials of how to interpret 
debt on the balance sheet. Deposit takers tipically have huge amounts of debt on its balance sheet, 
which complicates the task of estimating the WACC (Young et al. 1999). If one relates EVA with the 
Enterprise Value (EV), the following formula is derived (Damodaran 2005):  
7. EV = Invested Capitalassets in place + ∑
                    
(      ) 
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2.2.7. ECONOMIC PROFIT METHOD 
As the DCF models rely solely on how cash flows enter and exit the company, it doesn’t provide 
insight into the company’s economic performance. The understanding of the rise or decline in free 
cash flows can be the key when making strategic decisions that imply an understanding of the 
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company’s evolution. Therefore, the economic profit based valuation model highlights how and 
when the company creates value ( Koller et al., 2005). 
8. Value0 = Invested Capital0 + ∑
Invested Capital
t-1 




t 1  
The future economic profits are valued using a constant growth rate in perpetuity. The formula above 
shows that when future economic profits are expected to be zero, the value of operations will equal 
invested capital. On the other hand, the company should be able to identify its competitive advantage 
when the value of operations is higher than its invested capital. 
2.2.8. VALUATION IN EMERGING MARKETS 
With the increasing globalization observed in recent years, companies have increasingly expanded to 
emerging markets, which have offered them attractive investments and a lot of different 
opportunities. The problem with this vast mobilization of capital begins when the need for valuation 
appears.  
Companies involved in projects in those markets face much more risks, including accelarated 
inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, adverse repatriation laws and fiscal measures or even 
macroeconomic or political distress (Goedhart et al,  2003). The different measures of those risks and 
the way investors see them, lead to the use of different assumptions or different approaches and, 
consequently, to different final estimations in the valuations.  
James et al. (2003) suggest that the best approach in these cases is to use discounted cash flows 
(DCFs) together with probability-weighted scenarios that model the risks each business faces. They 
argue that the extra risk involved in these markets should be included either in the assessment of the 
actual cash flow or in the extra risk premium added to the discount rate. On the other hand, Goedhart 
et al. (2003) state that sometimes investors overestimate those risks, which make them reject good 
investment opportunities and underestimate the performace of existing businesses. They argue that 
the risk involved in these markets can be much more modest if it is spread over a diverse portfloio of 
investments and that both a cash-flow-scenario approach or a country-risk-premium approach can 
generate accurate valuations if it takes into account findings in emerging-markets investment risks. 
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2.3. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS 
 
2.3.1. TERMINAL VALUE 
The terminal value is one of the most important estimation parameters in valuation. When the 
company wants to make a cash flow valuation in a certain period of time, it doesn’t know how much 
those cash flows will be worth somewhere in the future. Then, one should choose a specific time and 
then calculate the terminal value that reflects the value of the firm at that point (Damodaran 2002). It 
assumes that the company will be growing at a constant rate and therefore in a steady-state, 
reinvesting a constant proportion of its operating profits. That gives the company the Return on 
Invested Capital (ROIC).  
However, analysts tipically spend less time that they shouldn’t on estimating this variable. Forecasts 
for the next few years occupy only 10% to 20% of the analysts’ time, when it accounts for 80% to 
90% of the market value estimate (Young et al. 1999). Therefore, one should make very carefull 
assumptions when accounting for the terminal value. Koller et al. (2005) argues that the forecasting 
period should be around 5 to 7 years.  
9. Terminal Value = 
CFn   (1 g)
(k-g)
 
The Terminal Value can be estimated in three different ways. Firstly, by the liquidation of the firm’s 
assets in the terminal year, estimating what market value that firm has accumulated at that point and 
what others are willing to pay for those assets. The second approach applies a multiple to earnings, 
revenues or book value to estimate the value in the terminal year, assuming the firm as a growing 
concern at the time of the terminal value estimation. The third one assumes a steady-state by using a 
constant growth rate forever.  
2.3.2. PRESENT VALUE OF THE INTEREST TAX SHIELDS 
Seeing as debt is tax-deductible, companies benefit somehow from carrying debt on their balance 
sheets. This benefit is usually called tax shield, which represents an addition to the companies’ value. 
There are a lot of discussions about how to calculate the value of tax shields and it seems that there is 
no agreement on which discount rate to use. The majority of them assume that the present value of 
the tax savings on debt should be simply the present value of tax shields associated with interest.  
While Modigliani et al. (1958, 1963) state that the discount rate should be the risk free, Myers 
(1974), who introduced the APV approach, Luerhman (1997), Koller et al. (2005) and Damodaran 
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(2005) assume the discount factor is the cost of debt since the tax shield’s risk arises from the use of 
debt and to use the same risk is plausible.  
Fernández (2004) contradicts those results and states that the value of tax shields itself shouldn’t be 
the present value of the tax savings due to the payment of interest but rather one should look at the 
value of tax shields as the difference between the present value of taxes for the unlevered company 
and the present value of taxes for the levered company. And that is where the difficulty on assessing 
the value of tax shields arise. This is because their riskiness is difficult to evaluate, given that it 
depends on two flows with different risks (the taxes paid by the unlevered company and the taxes 
paid by the levered company). Therefore, one should consider the difference between those two cash 
flows and measure each one with its own level of risk (Fernández 2004). 
Cooper et al. (2005) reverse Fernández (2004) result and argue, as well as the previous authors, that 
the value of the debt tax savings is the present value of the tax savings from interest.  
Koller et. al (2005) presented a different perspective stating that what matters is the capital strucure 
choice. If the company expects its debt to growth with the business, according to a target debt-to-
value ratio, the risk of tax shields should be the same risk of the operaring assets (unlevered cost of 
equity). On the other hand, if that’s not believed, then the risk of tax shields should be the same as 
the cost of debt.  
2.3.3. RISK PREMIUM 
The results usually show that riskier investments should have higher expected returns, and the 
opposite works as well. Every expected return should consider the sum of the riskfree rate and an 
extra return to compensate for that specific level of risk (Damodaran 2002).  
The reasons that justify the risk taken provide from two different sources: the firm-specifications and 
the market around it. The first one (called diversifiable risk) is related only to that specific 
investment or to a few investments like it, whereas the second one (called non-diversifiable risk) 
contains the risk that affects a higher number of investments. Damodaran (2002) presents three 
different reasons that justify the fact of not all analysts using the same risk premiums. The first 
reason has to do with the time period that is used. This is because some analysts use short-time 
horizons and others use long-time horizons. The second reason is the choice of risk-free security, as 
there is a difference between using treasury bills and treasury bonds. The risk premium is higher if it 
is related to the first one, as it is related to short-term government securities. The final reason 
questions how the average return on stocks, treasury bills or treasury bonds are computed (since it 
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can be estimated by arithmethic or geometric means). The abovementioned reasons justify the 
differences that currently exist on the risk premiums used, depending on the choices that were made. 
Damodaran (2002) argues that they should range from 3.47% to 8.6%. 
2.3.4. LEVERED AND UNLEVERED BETA 
The betas are a measure of a company’s volatility in relation to the market where it belongs, adjusted 
to the degree of leverage of the firm’s capital structure. As debt is tax-deductible and therefore 
results in tax benefits, the levered beta has less volatility than the unlevered beta (which removes the 
impact from debt obligations). In order to compute raw betas, the standard procedure is to regress 
stock returns (Rj) against market returns (Rm), where its slope is the aimed beta: 
10. Rj = a + b (Rm - Rf ) 
Consequently, the company is riskier than the market when its beta is greater than one, as well as it is 
less risky than the market if its beta is lower than one. They both have the same risk if beta is equal 
to one.  
According to Fernández (2007), the relationship for a company that mantains a fixed book-value 
levarage ratio is the following: 
11.  
L
 =  
u




) D (1 – t) / E 
Miles and Ezzel (1980) present the subsequent relationship for a firm that maintains a fixed market-
value leverage ratio:  
12.  
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At last, Modigliani and Miller (1963) show the following relationship for a company with a preset 
debt in every period: 
13.  
L
 =  
u
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Damodaran (200) presents three different limitations associated with the betas. Besides the fact that 
they have a high standard error, they also reflect the firm’s business mix over the period of the 
regression, not the current mix. Furthermore, they show the firm’s average financial leverage over 
the period rather than the current period. Therefore, adjusting the regression beta estimate by 
bringing information about the company’s fundamentals or estimating the beta for the firm using 
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accounting earnings or revenues (which are less noisy than market prices) are two different solutions 
presented by Damodaran (2002).  
2.3.5. COST OF EQUITY 
The cost of equity is the return that investors require to invest in the company’s equity, in exchange 
for owning the asset and bearing the risk of ownership. To determine the Cost of Equity, the most 
common method is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), according to Damodaran (2001) and 
Koller et al. (2005). This approach is based on the work of Markowitz on diversification and 
portfolio theory. Therefore, the following expression may be used: 
14. Ke = Rf +  L [ E (Rm) – Rf ] 
2.3.6. COST OF DEBT 
The cost of debt represents the rate at which the company can currently borrow money. It is often 
measured as an after-tax basis, since interest payments are tax-deductible. The cost of debt reflects 
both the default risk and the level of interest rates in the market (Damodaran 2001).  
The most common approach to estimate them is to assume that the pre-tax cost of debt is equal to the 
yield to maturity (YTM) of the company’s long-term bonds. According to Damodaran (2001), this 
approach has the limitation that very few firms have long term straight bonds that are liquid and 
widely traded.  
Another common aproach, which applies if the firm is rated, is to estimate a default spread based on 
the rating of the firm. Compared to the first approach, this one presents more robustness. As different 
bonds from the same firm can have different ratings, one should use a median rating for the firm 
(Damodaran 2001).  
Finally, when it is the case that the company is not rated, one should look at the recent borrowing 
history and therefore deduce a rating based on the spreads paid. Moreover, a synthetic rating can be 
used to estimate the cost of debt, which could be deduced through the interest coverage ratio 
(Damodaran 2001): 
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2.3.7. FREE CASH FLOW TO THE FIRM (FCFF) AND FREE CASH FLOW TO 
THE EQUITY (FCFE) 
The Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) represents all the cash flows available to all the capital 
providers of the firm (common shareholders, preferred shareholders and debtholders), after removing 
from the EBIT the total of taxes and all the operating expenses. This means exluding amortization 
and depreciation, provisions and all non-cash charges. Besides that,  all expenditures required to 
maintain the firm’s productive capacity should also be removed, which means exluding accounts 
receivables/accounts payables, and all the cash flows that come from non-core activities, since they 
do not represent available cash for the firm. Items that represent financial cash flows should  also be 
removed, such as cash and cash equivalents, financial applications or debt.  
TABLE 2 - FREE CASH FLOW TO THE FIRM 
Source: Slides ‘’Thesis Equity Valuation – Basic Concepts II’’ – Prof. Dr. José Tudela Martins 
 
In relation to the Free Cash Flow to the Equity, the basic difference is that it represents the cash 
flows only available to common shareholders. Pinto (2010) states that this represents the cash flow 
outstanding after all operating expenses and capital expenditures have been made. According to 
Pinto (2010), to find FCFE, one must deduct from FCFF the after-tax interest expenses and then add 
net new borrowing.  
To calculate the FCFF or the FCFE is the first step to perform a valuation of a company using, for 
instance, the discounted cash flows method. Consequently, when calculating the enterprise value the 
only difference between them is in the discount rate. Whereas with the FCFF we should discount 
using the weighted average cost of capital, in the FCFE the discount rate should be the cost of equity, 
since the only present risk is the one faced by equityholders. 
EBIT 
- Taxes on EBIT 
+ Amortization + Provisions (Change) - All non cash Items 
= Cash Flow from operations 
- Investment on working capital 
- Capital Expenditures 
= Free Cash Flow from operations 
+ Cash Flow from non-operational sources 
= FCFF 
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According to these differences, the FCFF represents the obligations for both stockholders as well as 
bondholders, while the FCFE only represents the obligations for stockholders, which is useful in 
understanding how much the company could pay in dividends. Therefore, when the firm have an 
unstable capital structure or negative FCFE, it is better of to use the FCFF. 
3 .  COMPANY’S PRESENTATION  
The company on which this equity valuation thesis will be carried out is the BMW (Bayerische 
Motoren Werke) Group, founded in 1917 under the name Bayerische Flugzeugwerke AG (BFW). In 
1918 it was named Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (BMW AG). The primary 
distinction of BMW AG is the fact that it is one of the few automobile and motorcycle manufacturers 
worldwide whose focus is exclusively on producing premium and high quality products for all its 
brands and all its segments. Currently, BMW AG is a legal entity that owns the BMW, MINI and 
Rolls Royce brands. While the first one has the main goal of providing the pleasure for driving and 
the thrill and enthusiasm for innovation, the MINI brand tries to bring in the originality of the 
models, as well as the high recognition value and the distinctive design. Finally, Rolls Royce 
conveys luxury and the attention to the finest detail. BMW AG is not only focussed on the 
production of automobiles, but also has a position in the motorcycles market (by means of the BMW 
and Husqvarna brands) and offers a successful range of financial services. This sector’s largest 
business is credit financing and the lease of BMW group cars and motorcycles. 
FIGURE 1 - ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE BMW GROUP 
 
Source: Own creation using the annual reports 
BMW AG is a company listed on the stock exchange and traded in the DAX 40 and the EuroStoxx 
indices. Moreover, it represents one of the largest industrial companies in Germany, where it is 
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for the coordination of 150 countries. In terms of production facilities, the BMW group currently has 
29 units in 14 countries.  
Since 2007 this group has been investing on its successful future by adopting the Strategy Number 
ONE, with a new strategic long-term direction focussed on four fundamental pillars: Growth, 
Shaping the Future, Profitability and Access to Technologies and Customers. Thanks to this strategy, 
in 2012 BMW fulfilled all the interim targets, having delivered more than 1.84 million BMW, MINI 
and Rolls-Royce vehicles to customers, which represented an increase of more than 10% from the 
previous year. Moreover, it was the most successful year in the history of BMW AG. On the other 
hand, the BMW Group has demonstrated more and more concerned over social sustainability and 
ecological responsibility. Proof of that is the fact that they are now developing the fully electric 
BMW i3, the solution for emissions-free driving in urban areas, which should be launched this year. 
With that in mind, they have been the most sustainable company in the automotive industry for many 
years and they intend to be a leader in the future development of individual mobility. Consequences 
of these facts are shown below: 
Source: Company reports and own calculations  
GRAPHIC 3 - BMW GROUP IN FIGURES (ANNUAL DATA) 
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 Looking at BMW historically, one can say that the company has been performing better along the 
years in terms of revenues and operating cash flows. Depreciation and amortization and capital 
expenditures have been increasing as a result of the latest strong injections of capital.  
In order to have an idea of the developments of these figures in 2013, one should look at the data 
available at the time of the valuation and compare with the same moment of the last years. Thus, the 
following graphics were computed:  
 
  Source: Company reports and own calculations 
Revenues for the third trimester of 2013 were very similar to the ones of the same period in 2012, 
which explains one more time the remarkable year that 2012 was for the group. Nevertheless, 
depreciation and amortization are expected to increase and therefore the combination of both those 
variations should cause the operating cash flow to decline. Besides that, capital expenditures are 
expected to increase as a result of the huge injections of capital, and therefore cause free cash flows 
for the year to the very low.  
GRAPHIC 4 - BMW GROUP IN FIGURES (TRIMESTRAL DATA) 
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The year 2012 represented the most successful one on the history of BMW and the company is 
expected to keep growing at 2012 rhythm at least until 2014. Those exceptional figures were the 
result of the previous referred Number ONE strategy. That huge financial success also contributed to 
the investments already made this year and expected to be made along the next few years. In terms of 
operating expenses, research and development are the ones expecting to grow more, mostly due to 
the connection with projects to make safe their future growth.  
4 .  GENERAL ENVIRONMENT 
4.1. INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
In order to carry out a good valuation, it is extremely important to understand the industry where the 
company being valued is located. Macroeconomic conditions are crucial and a huge influence for the 
company’s forecasts. 
The first point to consider is the fact that global economy has been suffering a downturn since 2008, 
and is still currently experiencing huge effects. Therefore, this valuation will be extremely subjective 
due to the economic outputs felt during this period. This downturn was experienced fundamentally in 
Europe and in the United Kingdom, with the US economy remaining relatively stable. Those 
conditions led to the volatility in exchange rates all over the world. Moreover, higher prices for 
major raw materials were another consequence of these political uncertainties. Regarding that, Brent 
oil – the most important in Europe - remained at a high level, while the WTI oil – most relevant in 
the USA – decreased. Besides that, energy prices and prices of non-ferrous and precious metals 
remained at high levels.  
The automotive industry is one of the most important businesses in Europe, which is where this 
sector assumes the largest numbers for production of motors and passenger cars. This huge relevance 
can be explained from the fact that it is one of the highest employing industries and the key driver of 
knowledge and innovation. Moreover, it is closely connected with other industries – mechanical 
engineering, information technology, steel, etc. – which represent the largest percentage of value 
added in this industry. In relation to this sector, it is important to highlight fundamentally the 
increase in demand in the USA, China, Japan and Russia, while in Europe the demand for passenger 
cars and light commercial vehicles is still decreasing. In Germany, this decrease was less 
pronounced, while in France and Spain the opposite was observed.  
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The motorcycle market has also been contracting worldwide, with the highest drops being recorded 
in Europe. Nevertheless, last year this market segment grew in Germany, as well as in the USA, 
Brazil and Japan.  
In relation to the financial services, it is crucial to stress that political measures have been 
implemented in order to stabilize the financial markets in the euro zone. However, unfavourable 
economic developments in southern Europe (high debt levels and unemployment rates, for example) 
are still felt and have caused used car prices to drop in the region. By contrast, in North America, 
Germany and Great Britain price levels of used car markets remain stable.  
4.2. THE BMW GROUP OVERVIEW 
The automobile market represents the highest percentage of revenues for the BMW group (78% in 
2013), followed by the financial services (20% in 2013) and finally the motorcycle industry (only 2% 
in 2013).  
Despite the global downturn and the increase in volatilities all over the world, the BMW group 
maintained its premium position by not following the general tendencies of the global market. 
Therefore, 2012 represented the most exceptional year in BMW’s history, as it registered record 
sales in all automobile brands (BMW, Mini and Rolls Royce), motorcycle brands (BMW and 
Husqvarna) as well as and in the financial services provided for these first two segments. 
4.2.1. AUTOMOBILES SEGMENT 
In 2012, the BMW group owned 29 different production networks in 14 different countries. As for 
the contribution of each continent to BMW automobile sales, one can say that Europe represented the 
most significant consumer for the company (32%). Subsequently, the Asian and the American region 
also made a very good contribution, with 21% in sales recorded in the former and 19% in sales 
concentrated in the USA. These numbers represent an increase in all the regions of the graphic, 
except for France (where sales decreased 4%). In the near future, the BMW group is expected to 
open new assembly productions in Asia and America, thus further expanding production and sales in 
these continents. The next graphic represents the contribution of each continent or country to the 
level of sales achieved in 2012. 
 
GRAPHIC 5 - AUTOMOBILES' SALES DISTRIBUTION WORLDWIDE (2012)  



















Source: Company reports and own calculations 
4.2.2. MOTORCYCLES SEGMENT 
The motorcycle market also performed very well in 2012, registering record sales regardless of the 
adverse market conditions in this sector.  
The key motorcycle markets were similar to the ones of the automobile sector. However, in the 
former the whole European region, especially Germany, have more heavy weights in the percentage 
of revenues (48,1% and 19,1%, respectively). Consequently, Asia and America were not as relevant 
as consumers of motorcycles as they were for the automobile sector. Nevertheless, in 2012 the 
highest growth was achieved in Brazil and Japan, when compared to 2011 (+36, 8% and +22, 4%, 
respectively). By contrast, the market uncertainties in Europe made the sales in this region suffer a 
decrease of 5, 1% in comparison to 2011, with Germany and France as the only countries that 
contributed positively to this result.  
Besides the variety of different models presented to the customer during 2012, a prototype of an 
electric scooter is being developed and is expected to become available to customers in 2014 as well 
as other BMW and Husqvarna models. At the end of 2012, Germany accounted for 21% of the 
























GRAPHIC 6 - MOTORCYCLES' SALES DISTRIBUTION WORLDWIDE (2012) 
Source: Company reports and own calculations 
4.2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES SEGMENT 
The growth in the financial services throughout the years is the result of an increase in credit 
financing and new lease contracts related to the automotive part of the business. The Financial 
Services division operates in more than 50 countries all over the world as partner to the sales 
organization.  
The largest line of business in this segment is credit financing and the lease of the BMW group cars 
and motorcycles to retail customers, but it also comprises several more activities, such as banking, 
insurance, dealer financing or multi-brand financing. In 2012, credit financing and lease contracts 
increased by 10% and 16%, respectively. The number of retail customer contracts was also 6,7% 
higher than in the previous period.  
All regions worldwide contributed to the sales increase in this segment. Although the banks in 
Europe are the main clients, the increase was higher in the Asian and Pacific region, in comparison 
to last years’ records ( 24,2% in 2012, in relation to 2011). The final distribution of sales over the 
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GRAPHIC 7 - FINANCIAL SERVICES' SALES DISTRIBUTION WORLDWIDE (2012) 
Source: Company reports and own calculations 
5. COMPANY’S VALUATION 
5.1. DCF VALUATION 
As analysed in the literature review, one of the methods used to value the BMW group was the 
Discounted Cash Flow with the WACC approach. The valuation will be done as of 17th of October 
of 2013, and all market parameters refer to that date. If not, details are clearly stated. 
Since ever, the debt ratio of the company has being decreasing along the years. This decrease can be 
explained with the increases in equity or the retirement of old debt on the firm. Even so, over the last 
four years the capital structure of the firm has been close to the optimal target and therefore it’s 
expected to be kept, which justifies the absence of the Adjusted Present Value methodology to value 
the BMW group. The company has a debt ratio of just 34% in 2013, while in 2008 the debt ratio was 
about 66%. This far above the normal debt level can be explained with the financial crisis, where 
equity values dropped unexpectedly in the whole automobile industry. This also translates the recent 
decrease in the bankruptcy probability and bankruptcy costs of the company.  
Besides that, the company intends to keep its payout ratio between 30% and 40%. Given that it was 
about 32% in 2012 and 30% in 2011, it’s expected that an average level (35%) can be used for the 
explicit period, by means of enlargements in the dividends policy of the firm (which is an indicator 
of the strong future prospects that are expected).  
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In terms of growth, it is predictable that 2013 and 2014 will continue to be very positive years for the 
BMW group, which again expects to reach another record sales level. As it is not reasonable to think 
that these double-digit growths will last perpetually, it is assumed that until 2017 the company will 
achieve its steady growth state and return to the normal sales levels of the years before 2012.  
The growth rate assumed in this valuation was of 4, 24%, which is related to the global projections 
for nominal GDP forecasts and therefore should reflect the growth at which the company will growth 
during the valuation period.  It resulted from the multiplication of global forecasts for real GDP and 
European forecasts for inflation, in order to take care of the global presence and the currency effects, 
respectively. 
The free cash flow to the firm (FCFF) was computed in accordance with the formula stated in the 
literature review (section 3.3.7).  
5.1.1. VALUATION ISSUES 
This section will provide the main explanations and assumptions done for the forecasted period, in 
order to provide the discounted cash flow valuation. Revenues and costs of goods sold are the items 
that differ from segment and therefore will be analyzed separately. The remaining figures were 
calculated for the company as a whole, since for them the automobiles segment justify the highest 
weight and therefore those figures are almost exclusively related to the automobiles segment 
development. Therefore, it doesn’t make sense to analyze those figures by segment, given that the 
motorcycles and the financial services segment have very little weights on them.  
The performance of BMW will be forecast for a period of 4 years (from 2013 to 2017). That period 
was chosen in order to represent the high-growth period of BMW (which is expected to be from 
2012 and 2014) and 3 more years (2015-2017) that represent the stability of the company and the 
come back from the steady growth and normal figures recorded until now. 
5.1.1.1. BMW’S REVENUES 
Revenue is a core item of forecasting for BMW, because many things are held up against it to 
estimate value drivers. The next sections explain how revenues for the group and for each segment 
were projected.  
5.1.1.1.1. AUTOMOBILES SEGMENT 
BMW’s revenues are distributed all over the world, especially in the automotive segment. The year 
2012 also marked the expansion of the segment revenues for Asia and America, which are starting to 
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represent event more weights in the sales of cars from the company. Therefore, one has decided to 
use global forecasts in order to estimate the automobile revenues of the BMW group. According to 
IHS reports, the automobile industry is expected to sell 102 million cars worldwide in 2017, as 
shown below:  
GRAPHIC 8 - VEHICLE SALES OUTLOOK (IN UNITS) 
Source: IHS Automotive Light Vehicle Sales Outlook 
 
Given that projection, a Constant Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 3, 06% was reached and used to 
estimate BMW’s revenues of cars until 2017. The company has a long term target for sales in 2016 
of 2m vehicles according to the investor relations’ department, which was also the result obtained 
upon using the CAGR from the global projection. Those forecast units were multiplied by the 
maximum price reached by the company and not by the average price, in order to take into account 
the record sales of the company and the increase in market share expected in the next few years.  
5.1.1.1.2. MOTORCYCLES SEGMENT 
As shown below, motorcycles sales are also distributed worldwide and therefore they are exposed to 
global development. Given that, the same procedure used for the automobiles segment was used in 
the motorcycles segment, by looking at Research and Markets forecasts for the sales in this segment. 
According to these, the global motorcycle industry has been living a high growth period for the past 
five years and is expected to grow at a CA R of 4.9% over the next five years. Therefore, BMW’s 
motorcycle revenues were forecast by increasing historical revenues at that rate until 2017. 
5.1.1.1.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES SEGMENT 
According to the BMW quarterly report of 30th June 2013, the pace of growth reported for the 
Financial Services segment in the first six months of 2013 is likely to be maintained over the 
remainder of the year. Given that, 2013 revenues for the financial services were forecast by 
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increasing 2012 revenues at 2,3%, which was the growth rate registered in the first six months of 
2013. For the remaining years, financial services forecast revenues were calculated as an average of 
the percentage of the weight that this item represents in the automobile revenues, historically. As 
stated below, the growth in the financial services over the years is the result of the increase in credit 
financing and new lease contracts related to the automotive part of the business. 
5.1.1.2. BMW’S COST OF SALES 
The cost of sales comprises the cost of products sold and the acquisition cost of purchased goods 
sold. In the specific case of BMW, it also includes research costs and development costs not 
recognized as assets. Therefore, in order to obtain the Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) one must deduct 
the research and development expenses. That is because it is believed that the COGS margin will to 
some extent increase in the future, since the BMW Group will have to increase their investments in 
research and development in the future in order to be able to act in accordance with the strict CO2 
emission limits set in place by the European Union and the new electric models developed in the 
next few years. Thus, R&D expenses as a margin of revenue have been separated from the COGS 
margin to illustrate this more clearly. This figure will be explained further on. The following table 
allows us to look at the evolution of the company’s historical and forecast cost of sales.  
TABLE 3 - HISTORICAL AND FORECASTED COST OF SALES (IN € MILLION)  
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Cost of Sales - 
Automobiles 
43 505 39 616 44 703 50 164 56 525 59 506 61 088 63 022 65 017 67 009 
Cost of Sales - 
Motorcycles 
1 024 925 1 095 1 207 1 236 1 343 1 426 1 515 1 611 1 714 
Cost of Sales - 
Financial 
Services 
15 332 14 880 14 798 15 013 16 984 18 490 19 535 20 154 20 792 21 429 
Source: Company Reports and own calculations 
5.1.1.2.1. AUTOMOBILES SEGMENT 
Since global projections were used to estimate the revenues of this segment, the same would be used 
in order to estimate the COGS for the automobiles division. Moreover, the average of COGS to 
revenue in the period from 2003-2007 has been around 75%, whereas during the crisis it was much 
higher given the increase in raw material prices of metals and oil. In the period of 2008 and 2009, the 
COGS represented 112% of the revenues in the automobile segment. Given this inconsistency and 
the global assumption used previously, one had assumed that the number of vehicles sold would 
grow at a CAGR of 3,06% until 2017, which was also assumed when estimating the revenues for this 
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segment. Therefore, by knowing the number of cars expected to be sold and the COGS historical, we 
could look at an average of the cost per unit that BMW has been paying. That average cost per unit 
was multiplied by the number of cars expected to be sold in order to reach the COGS in absolute 
terms for the automobiles segment. It is then expected that this figure will represent on average 
80,9% of the revenues, during the forecasting period, which is a similar weight of the one registered 
in 2011 and 2012.  
5.1.1.2.2. MOTORCYCLES SEGMENT  
On average, the COGS for the motorcycle segment has been almost constant through the period of 
analysis. It also suffered from the crisis effect but given its lower magnitude in the BMW business, 
the effect was not as significant as the one of the automobiles segment. From the crisis onwards, it 
represented a higher weight of revenues (on average 84,5%), whereas before the crisis the weight 
was around 74%. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the weight has been the same since 2008 and 
still remains unchanged, one assumed that it will continue to represent the same percentage of 
revenues during the forecasting period. 
5.1.1.2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES SEGMENT 
As stated below, the financial services segment has a higher correlation with the developments of the 
automobile sector. That can also be seen by the amount of COGS as a % of revenues, in this 
segment. Like the automobiles segment, the years of the crisis had a huge effect on the increase in 
costs by the company (107% during 2008 and 2009). On the other hand, that weight was much lower 
in the years previous to the crisis (87% on average). In the last few years, BMW’s cost of sales has 
seemed to be recovering from the crisis effect and reaching the percentages of revenues seen 
historically before the crisis. Therefore, one had assumed that they will keep its COGS/Revenues 
average ratio demonstrated in the last few years during the forecasting period.  
5.1.1.3. SELLING AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Selling expenses of the BMW group comprise mainly marketing, advertising and sales personnel 
costs, whereas administrative expenses are related with expenses for administration not attributable 
to development, production or sales functions. Since this figure has represented historically very 
similar weights as a percentage of revenues (always between 9% and 10%) and no significant 
changes to this figure were identified by the company, one had assumed that they will represent an 
average of those percentages during the forecasting period (9, 8% of revenues). 










GRAPHIC 9 - SELLING AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AS A % OF TOTAL REVENUES 
Source: Company Reports and own calculations 
5.1.1.4. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES 
R&D expenses have been always a function of a percentage in revenues. In 2012, BMW’s research 
and development expenses rose by 10%, given the financial success reached in that year with an 
increase in revenues of 11%, which allowed the company to invest in projects to secure their future 
growth. Nevertheless, that figure continued to represent around 5, 2% of revenues, which is the 
percentage observed historically. 
Therefore, there is a very strong connection with R&D and revenues and this link is assumed to 
remain constant. The next graphic show the very closest to 5% ratios obtained by the company 
regarding research and development expenses, as well as the forecast years. It was assumed that an 
average of 5, 3% of revenues will be constant until 2017.  
GRAPHIC 10 - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES AS A % OF TOTAL REVENUES 
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5.1.1.5. OTHER OPERATING INCOME AND EXPENSES 
The variable ‘’other operating expenses” may be hard to predict, as it includes exchange losses, 
impairment losses and write downs amongst other items and then may vary from year to year 
depending upon both the external and internal environment. Nevertheless it is also believed that 
these costs are more likely to increase as the group expands their sales and operations (assuming that 
revenue increases as a result). The same happens with ‘’other operating income’’, for the same 
reasons. Then, historically, operating income (including exchange gains, income from reversals of 
provisions and income from reversals of impairment losses) had averaged 1,5% of revenues, without 
any significant change in any year. On the other hand, operating expenses (including exchange 
losses, expenses from additions to provisions or expenses from impairment losses) as a percentage of 
revenues have been higher since the beginning of the crisis. Consequently, it averaged out 1,8% of 
revenues after crisis and 0,8% before crisis. It will be assumed that it will keep its after-crisis weight 
since it has been constant throughout the previous years. Hence, other operating income is set equal 
to its historical average, whereas operating expenses are set equal to the after-crisis period average.  
5.1.1.6. INTEREST EXPENSES AND INCOME 
By looking at the bonds outstanding that the company has in the moment, it is possible to take out 
the interest expected to be paid over the forecasting period. According to interest income, it was 
observed that it had been averaged 10% historically of the profit before financial result. As a result, it 
is expected that it will stabilize within this average.  
5.1.1.7. RESULTS FROM EQUITY ACCOUNTED INVESTMENTS 
Results from Equity Accounted Investments include interests in the joint ventures of the company. In 
2012 it was higher given the BMW  roup’s share of the joint venture BMW Peugeot Citroën 
Electrification B. V. and a Joint Venture with BMW Brilliance Automotive Ltd., Shenyang. 
Therefore, in 2012 this figure weighted a higher percentage of the profit before financial result. 
Given the fact that the company expects to keep increasing its operations in emerging markets as 
done in 2012, it will then be expected that those investments will represent the average of this figure 
as a percentage of profit before financial result over the last two years, where the company integrated 
these future growth opportunities in its strategic analysis.  
5.1.1.8. OTHER FINANCIAL RESULT 
Impairment losses recognized in investments or losses/gains on stand-alone commodity and currency 
derivatives are included in this figure. This is a very inconstant figure and it is thus very hard to 
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forecast. Nevertheless, in the last two years it represent almost the same weight of profit and 
therefore it will be expected that the same percentage (7% of profit before financial result) will be 
maintained.  
5.1.1.9. INCOME TAXES 
The year 2008 was an exceptional time regarding this figure. BMW used a lot of their deferred tax 
assets to gain a higher profit, which explains the low 2% income tax rate to EBIT observed in this 
year. Hence, to include the historical average does not seem to be a reasonable assumption and 
therefore it was assumed that the effective tax rate of the company for the forecasting period will be 
an average of the last three years (31, 6%).  
5.1.2. FREE CASH FLOW TO THE FIRM 
 
5.1.2.1. DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION 
According to Koller et al. (2010), depreciation and amortization should be forecasted either as a 
percentage of revenue or as a percentage of property, plant and equipment (PP&E). Then, the 
depreciation and amortization rate for property plant and equipment and intangible assets used in the 
valuation was computed averaging the percentage of that figure in the tangible and intangible 
amount, over the period of analysis (2003-2012), since it has been representing very similar values 
along the years. Nevertheless, from 2008 onwards that weight has been a bit lower and therefore it’s 
assumed that the depreciation rate would be 9% of the tangible and intangible assets during the 
forecasting period, which is the average weight of D&A over tangible and intangible assets from 
2008 to 2012.  
GRAPHIC 11 – DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION AS A % OF TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
 

















Total provisions of the BMW group include pension provisions, other current provisions and other 
non-current provisions. Regarding the first one, they are recognized as a result of commitments to 
pay future vested pension benefits and current pensions to present and former employees of the 
BMW Group and their dependants. In relation with the other provisions, it is related with provisions 
for obligations for personnel and social expenses, consisting mainly of performance-related 
remuneration, early retirement part-time working arrangements and employee long-service awards. 
As a result, the forecasting of provisions for the period 2013-2017 was based on the total personnel 
expenses projected. It includes primarily wages and salaries and social security, retirement and 
welfare costs.  
5.1.2.3. INVESTMENT IN WORKING CAPITAL 
Regarding the investments in working capital of the BMW group, it included all the non-financial 
figures recorded by the company. Therefore, trade receivables, receivables from sales financing, 
current tax on assets, inventory, other current assets were summed up and then trade payables, 
current tax on liabilities and other short-term liabilities deducted in order to compute the working 
capital amount.  
When estimating each one of these variables for the forecasting period, it was assumed that each 
rubric would maintain the same Days Inventory Held (DHE), Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) or 
Days Payables Outstanding (DPO) registered in 2012 or the average of the last years, according to 
what the company expects to reflect more in the future prospectus. This assumption was made by the 
fact that in almost all the figures these last year terms represented the average observed historically. 
On the one hand, DSO was used to forecast trade receivables, receivables from sales financing, 
current tax on assets or other current assets, in order to measure the number of days that a company 
takes to collect its revenues after a sale has been made. On the other hand, DPO is an indicator of 
how long a company is taking to pay its trade creditors, and therefore was applied in the projection 
of trade Payables, other short-term liabilities as well as current tax on financial liabilities. The 
inventory variable was estimated through the using of inventory average levels, by transmitting an 
idea of how long a company takes to take its inventory into sales.  
5.1.2.4. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
Over the last three years the capital expenditures of the firm represented around 5% of the revenues, 
which represented a decrease compared to the remaining years of the historical analysis. 










Historical % Capex over sales
Company's Target
Nevertheless, the company stated in the 2012 annual report that they intend to maintain a target ratio 
between investments on assets and revenues of 7%. 2013 and 2014 are considered ‘strong’ 
investment years as the BMW Group tries to make itself more future proof and meet stricter 
regulation and environmental standards. Therefore, this growth in capital expenditures will primarily 
be due to the expansion of the production network and the preparations for the new models and 
architectures (BMW i & MINI). In addition, development costs will be capitalized for the 
development of new models and product derivatives, new vehicle and engine architectures, and new 
vehicle and drive concepts (e.g. lightweight construction and electric cars). Hence, it was assumed 
that the CapEx ratio will be above 8% in 2013 to include the strongest investments. Since the current 
aim is to reduce the ratio in 2014 compared to 2013 and achieves 7%, which is the percentage used 
between 2014 and 2017. 
GRAPHIC 12- HISTORICAL CAPEX OVER SALES 
Source: Company’s reports and own calculations 
5.1.3. WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL (WACC) 
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is a measure of the opportunity cost that investors 
face when investing in any stock. The formula used to calculate that risk was the following (Koller 
et.al. 2005):  WACC = 
D
D E




The estimated (WACC) of the BMW group was about 5,8%. All the parameters were calculated by 
myself, except the tax rate, and explained on the following sections. The next table summarizes the 
results obtained and the constituents of BMW’s WACC: 
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TABLE 4 - CONSTITUENTS OF WACC 
WACC 5,8% 
Cost of Debt 3,1% 
Cost of Equity 7,7% 
Tax Rate 31,6% 
Total Debt/Total Assets 34% 
Total Equity/Total Assets 66% 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
The effective tax rate of the company has been around 31,6% over the previous years, on average. 
Excluding the exceptional years of the crisis, an average of the tax rates verified in the last few years 
is expected to be kept. The corporate tax rate in Germany is lower (around 29% in 2012), although 
the trend is for the group to expand even more around the world and pay taxes in countries where the 
tax rate is higher than the German one.  Thus, an average of the last years represents a spread over 
the corporate tax rate and is, at the same time, similar to the actual effective tax rate of the company. 
Effective tax rate was used given the complexity in finding marginal tax rates. 
5.1.3.1. CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
The weights used as capital structure to the valuation of the BMW group were based on market 
values (as stated by Koller et al. 2005). The BMW group has two different stock classes: common 
and preferred shares. The second ones are usually treated as if they were debt and this is not in line 
with BMW preferred stocks, which are not yielding a fixed dividend.  Moreover, shareholders that 
hold preferred stock are entitled to receive more dividends per year than common stock owners. A 
preferred stock yields 0.02 € more per share than a common stock. On these conditions, preferred 
stock will be used as equity and not as debt. Therefore, market capitalizations for both classes of 
stock were calculated on our own by multiplying the number of common and preferred shares by the 
respective market price. These two different stock classes gave us weights for common equity and 
preferred equity, which were both aggregated to form the final equity ratio of 66%. Moreover, the 
preferred equity constitutes approximately 4% of the total equity of the firm, whereas the common 
equity represents 62%. 
Based on the information provided by the company and the current market trends, an equity ratio of 
66% and a debt ratio of 34% were assumed for the forecasting period of the valuation, representing 
therefore the same capital structure of 2013. Those weights are related only with the information 
available on the date of the valuation, representing therefore the first semester of the year. 
Nevertheless, it’s similar to the previous year and therefore it’s expected to be kept. 
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In order to obtain the market values of debt, interest expense of each year was divided by the cost of 
debt. The next table summarizes the market weights obtained through these calculations:  
TABLE 5 - MARKET WEIGHTS FOR CAPITAL STRUCTURE (IN € MILLIONS, EXCEPT FOR PRICES AND RATIOS) 
 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 
Interest Expense 930 1.014 966 943 913 847 
Total Debt 29.801,7 32.493,5 30.955,3 30.218,3 29.257,0 27.142,0 
Number of Common 
Shares 
602,0 602,0 602,0 602,0 602,0 602,0 
Price (common shares) 21,6 31,8 58,9 51,8 72,9 81,4 
Market Capitalization 
(Common Equity) 
13.009,1 19.143,4 35.427,4 31.159,3 43.903,5 49.020,5 
Number of preference 
shares 
52,2 52,7 53,2 53,6 54,0 53,6 
Price of preference 
shares 
13,9 23,0 38,5 36,6 48,8 61,4 
Market Capitalization 
(Preferred Equity) 
723,4 1.211,3 2.046,8 1.958,0 2.632,7 3.289,2 
Total Market 
Capitalization 
13.732,5 20.354,7 37.474,2 33.117,3 46.536,2 52.309,7 
D/V 68% 61% 45% 48% 39% 34% 
E common/V 30% 36% 52% 49% 58% 62% 
E preferred/V 1,66% 2,29% 2,99% 3,09% 3,47% 4,14% 
E/V 32% 39% 55% 52% 61% 66% 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
 
5.1.3.2. COST OF EQUITY 
There are several ways of calculating the cost of equity, according to different analysts. Among a 
variety of different ways to estimate the cost of equity of a company, I will use the formula proposed 
by Robert F. Bruner et.al. (1998) which is commonly known as the CAPM equation (stated in 
section 3.3.5 of the literature review): 
Ke = Rf +  L [ E (Rm) – Rf ] 
There are more models that have also gained recognition on the previous years, such as the Fama-
French three-factor model and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) (Koller et.al, 2005). However, I 
decided to use the CAPM equation given the fact that it is the most common and preferred model 
among analysts and it has been tested over the years providing usually reasonable results.  
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The next table summarizes the inputs obtained (which are explained in the following sections): 
TABLE 6 - COST OF EQUITY CONSTITUENTS 
 
Risk free Rate Beta 
Market Risk 
Premium 
Cost of Equity 
Daily (used) 1,87% 1,09 4,98% 7,30% 
Weekly 1,87% 1,07 5,49% 7,71% 
Monthly 1,87% 1,12 4,94% 7,38% 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
5.1.3.3. RISK FREE RATE 
Since the 10-year German Bund is the most common used to value companies in Europe, it was the 
one I chose to the valuation of the BMW group. Therefore, the risk free rate used was the yield of the 
day of the valuation (1, 87% at 17th of October of 2013). The data for the daily 10-year German 
Bund was taken from Bloomberg.  
5.1.3.4. MARKET RISK PREMIUM 
Since the BMW group is listed on the German stock exchange, the market risk premium was 
calculated by comparing the returns of the Dax 40 index and the risk free rate. The prices of the 
German index were taken from Bloomberg and returns were computed. As stated before, the risk 
free rate was based on the 10-year German bund, also taken from Bloomberg. However, Bloomberg 
always give this last indicator with annualized values. In order to go beyond this data limitation, all 
the inputs were transformed into daily, weekly and monthly values. The procedure used to perform 
this transformation was the following: [(1  Rfannualized)
1 n
 ] -1. Given this, the n parameter was 
adjusted according to the three different frequencies used. The time-frame used for all the 
frequencies was from 2004 until 17th of October of 2013 (day of the valuation). This was done in 
order to include both the crisis influence and the pre-crisis period. Moreover, it was the one that 
produced the most reasonable value, according to Damodaran (which states that the risk premium for 
German should be between 4% and 6%).  
Finally, weekly data was the one chosen to be used on the valuation since it provided the highest R2 
on the CAPM regression. Finally, the market risk premium obtained was of 5,49%. 
Country risk premium for  ermany was assumed to be zero, as it is stated in Damodaran’s website. 
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5.1.3.5.  BETA 
The used beta for the valuation of the BMW group was the one computed by means of the CAPM 
regression, given historical BMW returns as the dependant variable and the market risk premium as 
the independent variable. Those calculations were once again performed with three different 
frequencies (daily, weekly and monthly) and from the same time-frame as the market risk premium 
(from 2004 until 17th of October of 2013). The beta chosen was the one obtained from the weekly 
data, also from the same reason (it provided the highest R2 on the CAPM regression). Therefore, the 
beta used was 1,07. This much closer to 1 result can be explained by the fact that the automobile 
segment (which is the responsible for biggest percentage of revenues of the company) is much more 
related with macroeconomic factors than with company specific factors (such as operating risks). 
This can also be seen by the fact that almost all the companies in the peer group present very close to 
1 betas, as we can see in table 7: 
Table 7 - Betas of the Peer Group 
 
Beta 
DAIMLER AG-REGISTERED SHARES 1,13 
VOLKSWAGEN AG 0,92 
RENAULT SA 1,24 
FORD MOTOR CO 1,18 
NISSAN MOTOR CO LTD 1,09 
Source: Bloomberg (from 2004 to 17th of October of 2013) 
 
5.1.3.6. COST OF DEBT 
An historical cost of debt was computed by looking at all of its long-term bonds outstanding at the 
time of the valuation and therefore by doing a weighted average of their interest rates, according to 
its amount outstanding. In this case, the cost of debt obtained was 2, 72%.  
Nevertheless, different analysts defend that the cost of debt used to calculate the WACC should 
reflect the market rates that the company has negotiated mostly closely to the time of the valuation. 
Given this, the procedure was to look to the most recent bond issues from BMW at 17/10/2013. The 
bond found in this conditions were issued in 4/9/2013 with 990 million € with a yield of 1, 84%. 
Since both short and long term ratings of the firm have been stable along the years and therefore it’s 
expected a low cost of debt, it seems to be a reasonable value to use in the valuation of the company. 
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Moreover, ratings of S&P and Moody’s (A and A2, respectively) were attributed by certifying that 
BMW‘s found a solvency position for debt with a maturity of more than one year and with the 
expectation of a sustainable higher level of earnings and cash flow generation in future. 
Nevertheless, a spread should be summed up in order to catch possible future fluctuations that 
influence the interest rate. Then, an Euribor spread for a 5 years period of 1,277% was aggregated to 
the latest issued bond yield and the final cost of debt used for this valuation was 3, 12%. 
5.1.4. OUTPUT OF THE VALUATION 
The first step in this valuation was to collect all the previous information and then calculate the 
FCFF to the firm, as on section 3.3.7 of the literature review. In order to calculate the present value 
of the FCFF, the free cash flows are discounted at the WACC rate of 5, 8% per year. The PV of the 
FCFF in the horizon period is €87 216 Million, as shown in the table below. Furthermore, FCFF in 
the terminal period is calculated as FCFF in the terminal year 2017 divided by the WACC less the 
assumed terminal growth rate of 4, 2% (Easton et al. 2010). The sum of horizon period FCFF and 
terminal period FCFF yields an enterprise value of the BMW  roup of €90 619 million. Moreover, 
an equity value of €60 606 Million and a debt value of €30 013 Million were found. The second one 
was achieved by assuming an average of the last three years debt, whereas the first one was the result 
of the deduction of that debt level from the total value achieved. Therefore, an equity ratio of 66% 
and a debt ratio of 34% were accomplished. Then, by dividing that for a 658 Million shares 
outstanding, a price per share of 92,1€ was obtained. It was assumed that the number of common 
shares would remain equal, in view of the fact that it has been the same since 2010. On the other 
hand, the number of preferred shares has been increasing by an average of 0, 79% and therefore that 
increase justifies the increase in the total number of shares from 655 Millions to 658 Millions.  
TABLE 8 - VALUES OBTAINED THROUGH THE DCF VALUATION 
Price 92,1 € 
Terminal Value 87 216 380 750 
Sum PV future CF 3 403 309 393 
Value 90 619 690 143 
Equity 60 606 462 019 
Debt 30 013 228 124 
Nº of shares 658.154.631 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
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5.2. DIVIDEND DISCOUNT MODEL 
With the aim of knowing the intrinsic value of the BMW stock, a final price was obtained by 
discounting the dividends that are expected to distribute to the shareholders of the company. We 
know that the company pays part of its Free Cash Flow as dividends and besides it’s expected to 
keep constant its financial policy, which are both basic conditions to the using of this model. In order 
to have a constant cost of equity, named k, it’s required that the leverage ratio of the firm doesn’t 
change, since it implies changes in this variable.  
In order to use this approach, one had to assume also that the free cash flow to the equity of the firm 
will grow at a constant rate called g, year after year. This g was assumed to be the same terminal 
growth rate used on the DCF approach, in order to represent the steady growth stage of the firm. 
Consequently, the Dividend Discount Model was applied to the BMW by using the following 
formula to obtain the terminal value for the company:  
P0  
E (DPS)
ke  Expected  rowth in Perpetuity
 
The sum of the present value of all the expected future dividend payments, discounted at a constant 
cost of equity of 7, 7% should be added to the terminal price to obtain the price that values the 
company. Those calculations were applied for the two different stock classes that BMW owns -
common stock and preferred stock - since they differ on the amount of dividends received, as 
expected.  Preferred shareholders have received more 0, 02€ in dividends than common shareholders. 
We know that the payout ratio of any firm represents the dividends per share divided by the earnings 
per share. Further, the company intends to keep its payout ratio between 30% and 40%. Given that it 
was about 32% in 2012 and 30% in 2011, it’s expected that an average level (35%) can be obtained 
in 2013 and 2014, which increases the dividends policy of the firm (which is an indicator of the 
strong future prospects that are expected). As a result of those two indications, it’s possible to 
multiply the expected payout ratio to the expected EPS and therefore obtain the expected dividends 
that the company will pay.  
Finally, by applying those values to the formulas specified one should obtain a common stock price 
of 93,4€ and a preferred stock price of 94,7€. By comparing this results with the ones obtained 
through the DCF approach, one can observe the discrepancy between them. When the DDM gives 
higher prices than the DCF, the conclusion is that the firm has greater dividends comparing to the 
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FCFE. This fact can have some consequences to the company, given that to exceed these high 
dividends, the firm will have to issue new debt or new equity to pay them. By borrowing money to 
do that, the firm takes the risk of turning away of its optimal and the risk of increases in bankruptcy, 
as well as high bankruptcy costs. If new equity is issued, the cost may be too high and then create 
high expenditures. These consequences should be taken into account closely since they can change 
the capital structure of the firm. Since dividends are not sustainable forever, it’s better to look to the 
DCF result as a valuation method for the BMW group.  
5.3. RELATIVE VALUATION 
As stated by Fernandez (2002) the use of multiples is very important in order to be a complement 
valuation of other methods, especially the DCF. According to this, one will use the multiples 
approach with the aim of checking whether the results obtained in the Discounted Cash flow hold or 
not. The candidates for this valuation were the ones discussed previously in the literature review: the 
Price to Earnings Ratio, the Enterprise Value to EBITDA, Enterprise Value to EBIT and Enterprise 
Value to Sales. As stated before, while the PER is even more used, the Enterprise Value multiples 
are less susceptible to changes in the debt ratio of the companies than the first one, according to 
Goedhart et al. (2003). From these, it was also showed that adjusted EBITDA performs better than 
EBIT and sales (Liu 2002). 
5.3.1. PEER GROUP 
Establishing the peer group is a fundamental part of any valuation analysis, essentially in strategic 
terms. The ratios of that peer group derive very important insights about any company’s competitors 
and therefore is a very good starting point for further valuations.  
In order to start defining the peer group, the preliminary step was to define it according to Liu et al. 
(2002) and therefore to choose companies whithin the same market and business segment. Therefore, 
the second step was to go into bloomberg and look to the closest 20 companies of BMW according to 
several pointers - companies chosen were from the same market and had similar revenues. Besides 
that, data was collected from the last year and companies from all over the world were chosen, since 
BMW’s sales and production facilities are distributed worldwide. Therefore, a centroids approach 
was made in order to restrict bloomberg’s peer group to the ones even closer according to sales 
growth, cost of capital, ROIC and capital structure. ROIC was used instead of ROA or ROE in order 
to take into account investments by debtholders, as well, or to assume that only invested capital can 
create higher net income.  The main purpose of this choice was to look at different indicators of 
profitability, growth rate (as stated by Goedhart et al. 2005), capital structure and cost of capital. The 
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method gave six different companies (Daimler AG, Volkswagen, Renault, Peugeot, Ford and 
Nissan).  
Since the Audi Group is not listed on the stock exchange by itself, but is a part of the Volkswagen 
Group, the Volkswagen Group is used as a peer instead of the Audi Group in this case. From these 
peer group, only Peugeot was excluded since it doesn’t share the same strategic vision of the others. 
This can be influenced by the takeover of Citroen from this company, since the new strategy of the 
group aims to separate the two brands in order to target two different costumers groups. Therefore, 
whereas the Peugeot brand aims to be more close to the others of the BMW’s peer group (with 
elegant dynamics, perceived quality and innovative driving), the Citroen brand aims to target a 
complete different public, who is searching for less sophisticated and easy to use technology and 
purist design). The Daimler Group is probably the best peer of the BMW group in terms of the 
products and services offered and recognition in the market. According to all of this restrictions, the 
companies chosen to be the peer group of the BMW group were Daimler, Volkswagen, Renault, 
Ford and Nissan, as shown in table 9:  
TABLE 9 - PEER GROUP INDICATORS (%) 
Name 








7,28 6,57 5,65 50,4% 
VOLKSWAGEN 
AG 
20,92 6,64 5,05 37,5% 
RENAULT SA -3,19 1,19 5,64 44,0% 
FORD MOTOR CO -1,48 4,59 6,25 54,6% 
NISSAN MOTOR 
CO LTD 
2,34 4,54 5,91 38,9% 
Source: Bloomberg (trailing 12 months) 
TABLE 10 - BMW GROUP INDICATORS (%) 






11,66 4,64 5,56 50,6% 
Source: Bloomberg (trailing 12 months) 
  
According to our peer group, BMW currently trades at a significant premium to its peers. As can be 
observed from table 9 and table 10, the BMW Group had the second highest growth rate on a year-
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end comparison, after Volkswagen (11,6% comparing to 20,9%), reflecting one more time the huge 
sales volume of the company in the last few years. Moreover, it can be observed that half of the 
companies in the peer group observed negative sales growth, which shows the impacts of the 
financial crisis in this business segment and the superior profitability of BMW even in times like 
this. The company also had one of the lowest ROIC. Volkswagen is again the company with the 
highest ROIC comparing to the peers, reveling its higher efficiency at allocating the capital in order 
to make profitable investments. Even so, the ROIC of the BMW group is considered to be very high, 
which can be explained by the fact that BMW is always one step ahead with the consecutive 
launching of attractive products. Moreover, the premium car market may be more concentrated and 
less competitive than the general automotive market and then have a higher ROIC. That can be 
confirmed with the lowest ROIC on the general automotive brands, like Renault, Ford or Nissan, and 
the highest ROIC on the premium brands of the peer group: Daimler, Volkswagen and BMW. In 
terms of cost of capital, we can observe that BMW is very well positioned according to its peers, by 
having one of the lowest cost of capital (5,56%). In relation to the capital structure, the Daimler 
corporation is the one with the closest debt-to-total-assets ratio. 
5.3.2. THE MULTIPLES APPROACH 
After choosing the peer group of the BMW group as discussed below, the harmonic mean of the peer 
group’s multiples was computed and then multiplied by the respective driver. 
From the 4 different candidates and most used multiples discussed above, the choosen one to value 
BMW was the EV/EBITDA. As discussed in the literature review, it’s one of the most widely used 
multiples in valuations.  
The PER,  which is computed by taking the ratio of the latest price and the earnings from the year, 
it’s also commonly used given it’s simplicity and by linking company value to profit. Nevertheless, it 
is, according to Koller et al. (2010), distorted by capital structure and non-operating gains and losses. 
Moreover, the denominator is based on an accounting measure of earnings, which is vulnerable to 
forms of manipulation. Therefore, its quality truly depends on the accuracy of the earnings forecasts. 
As we can observe on the table below, the price per share obtained through this multiple was of 63€, 
which represents an overvaluation in the market of the BMW share price (83€ at the date of the 
valuation). This result is different from the one obtained through the DCF and DDM models, which 
may happen given the fact that with multiples we are valuing only one period, and therefore not 
taking into account the future profitability of the group (which may rise the prices).  
                Equity Valuation of the BMW Group 
 
53 
The Enterprise Value multiples represent the ratios between the entreprise values and the respective 
trailing twelve month denominator (EBITDA, EBIT or sales). The EV/Sales multiple is computed by 
taking the stock price and the sales per share. On the other hand, on the first and second ones, one 
should apply the multiple to the forecasted denominator (EBITDA or EBIT) and deduct the total net 
interest bearing debt of the group from that value. Enterprise value over Sales was excluded from the 
valuation given the fact that BMW registered record sales in the last years (which didn’t happen in 
the majority of the comparable companies). Additionally, Liu et al. (2001) also stated that it’s the 
multiple that performs worst. Furthermore, the EV/EBIT multiple assumes that the company has 
similar ROIC, WACC, tax rate and terminal growth rate, according to Petersen and Plenborg (2011), 
which in most cases might not be completely truthful. The EV/EBITDA, on the other hand, is widely 
used to value firms and it does not include depreciation and amortization costs and is, therefore, less 
susceptible to manipulations in accounting policies. 
The use of the PE  ratio was also considered. Nevertheless, it didn’t seem to apply well in the case 
of BMW given its high growth momentum and expexted growth volatility during the explicit period. 
Then, there is no time-frame for which the growth rate should be taken into account and it doesn’t 
trasmit the true value of the company stock price. 
Moreover, forward earnings were used, since trailing earnings are not representative of the firm’s 
future value, given the high growth period that the firm is living on the last year and is expected to 
live in the next few years. 
TABLE 11 - MULTIPLES VALUATION (2013, IN €)  
Name PER EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT 
Harmonic Mean 11 8 16 
BMW’s Driver 3 784 460 998 11 613 156 969 6 449 885 451 
BMW’s price per share 63 94 111 
Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
In conclusion,  the EV/EBITA appeared to be the most reasonable multiple to use, by valuing BMW 
stock price at 94€ in 2013. The same was done for 2012 and 2014, which can be seen in the 
appendices section. This result is in accordance with the undervaluation of the BMW stock reflected 
both with the DCF and the DDM models. 
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6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
All the previously mentioned valuation was carried out with the assumption that the variables used 
for the growth rate and for the cost of capital are the ones that best describe the current and future 
prospectus of the BMW group. Nevertheless, we know that the companies are living times of higher 
uncertainties and therefore it is important to understand how those affect the equity value of the 
company and the final stock price. This sensitivity analysis will be conducted on the variables weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The choice of these 
variables was related to the fact that they represent the most important figures in the development of the 
company value.   
The sensitivity analysis was performed by drawing two-dimensional data tables. This meant it was 
possible to change two variables at the same time (growth rate and WACC).  
TABLE 12 - SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (VARIABLES: GROWTH RATE AND WACC) 
 
Growth Rate – 5%  
(4%) 
Growth Rate baseline (4, 
24%) 
Growth Rate + 5%  
(4,5%) 
WACC - 5% (5,5%) 97,0 € 112,8 € 135,0 € 
WACC baseline  
(5,8%) 
81,6 € 92,1 € 106,7 € 
WACC + 5% (6,1%) 70,7 € 78,5 € 88,4 € 
Source: own calculations 
From the table above we can see that changes in the cost of capital of the firm truly influence the 
price of the BMW stock. On the worst case scenario, if the WACC decreases 5%, the price increases 
by 20,7€ and if the WACC increases by the same percentage the stock price decreases 13,6€. On the 
other hand, by keeping the cost of capital constant, we can see that changes in the growth rate also 
influence very much the price. In the worst case scenario, if the growth rate decreases 5%, the stock 
price of the company varies 10,5€ and if the growth rate increases by the same amount the stock 
price varies 14,6€.  
The EBIT is a further extremely important variable in the valuation of BMW. Therefore, a sensitivity 
analysis was made in order to catch the effects that different changes (positively or negatively) can 
have on the equity value and therefore on the stock price of the company. From the table below we 
can observe the value, equity value and stock price based on different EBIT levels for the company is 
presented. 
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TABLE 13 - SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (VARIABLE: EBIT) 
Source: own calculations 
Through the table above we see that increases of 5% on the EBIT along the explicit period would 
decrease the company stock price from 92, 1€ to 118,2€, representing a positive change of 26€ on the 
share price. On the other hand, decreases of 5% on the EBIT variable would decrease the company’s 
share price by 26,5€ and thus represent a 29% negative change. As a result, it’s observable that the 
EBIT variable changes truly influence the share price in a larger scale. Nevertheless, the EBIT used 
on this valuation is in accordance with the one that the investor relations departments expects for the 
explicit period and therefore changes are not anticipated yet. 
In conclusion, we can state that the equity value is significantly influenced by the change of WACC, 
growth rate and EBIT. Particularly the WACC proved to be very significant, which is consistent with 
the valuation technique of discounting cash flows by the WACC. 
7. THE VALUE AT RISK 
The Value at Risk (VaR) is a recent risk management model that aims to measure the potential risk 
of any firm within a specific portfolio of assets and time frame, for a given confidence interval. By 
looking into it, firms are able to control the level of risk that assures the company’s prospectus 
wouldn’t be below expected. This model can be used for an individual asset, a portfolio of assets or 
Changes Value Equity Price 
-0,05% 72 596 435 338 43 203 275 508 65,6 € 
-0,04% 76 053 766 968 46 660 607 139 70,9 € 
-0,03% 79 511 098 599 50 117 938 769 76,1 € 
-0,02% 82 968 430 229 53 575 270 399 81,4 € 
-0,01% 86 425 761 859 57 032 602 030 86,7 € 
0,00% 90 619 690 143 60 606 462 019 92,1 € 
0,01% 93 340 425 120 63 947 265 291 97,2 € 
0,02% 96 797 756 751 67 404 596 921 102,4 € 
0,03% 100 255 088 381 70 861 928 552 107,7 € 
0,04% 103 712 420 012 74 319 260 182 112,9 € 
0,05% 107 169 751 642 77 776 591 813 118,2 € 





















































































































































for an entire firm. This model however has one underlying assumption – it is based on the current 
level of risk of the firm, based on the portfolio that the firm has at that specific moment and 
assuming it would remain the same. Nevertheless, we know that the volatility in the past might not 
be the same in the future. It is important to state that this measure can be used in any entity but it is 
most commonly used by commercial and investment banks.  
In order to compute the VaR, several methodologies can be applied. It can be based on a previously 
known distribution, in which the financial losses depend on hypothesis of the behaviour of the 
distribution of the return’s probability or it can be based on the history of returns to understand the 
financial losses. In this case, the second methodology would be applied through a Monte Carlo 
Simulation, with weekly data and within a range from January 1st, 2003 to December 6th, 2013. As 
shown in graphic 12, the returns don’t follow a normal distribution and are skewed to the right. So as 
to make that conclusion, a normal random generator was used with an average of 0,18% and a 
standard deviation of 4,48%, the same ones as the sample. The result is shown on the following 
histogram, with 30.000 times simulations: 
Source: own calculations 
Then by ordering returns by a ranking and by looking at the 1500 lowest ones (calculated for a 95% 
confidence interval), we arrived to the conclusion that the weekly VaR is 7, 4%. On another 
perspective, we could look into a 90% confidence interval and conclude that the weekly VaR is 5, 
5%. Therefore, one should conclude that this asset has a probability of 5% of falling more than 7, 4% 
GRAPHIC 13 - HISTOGRAM 
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and a probability of 10% of falling more than 5, 5%. Accordingly, one can state that with a 95% 
confidence, the price target on this valuation (92, 1€) would not fall more than 6, 6€.  
8. RESEARCH REPORT COMPARISON 
In order to once more test the consistency of the valuation that has been performed, this section aims 
to compare the results in this dissertation with the ones published by the investment bank JP Morgan 
on December 3rd, 2013. The choice of this report was related with it being the most recent report 
published until the date of the valuation and with its clarity in terms of information. 
The report published by JP Morgan valued the company only until 2015, and therefore it represents a 
smaller period than the one chosen to this dissertation. In order to have a rational basis of 
comparison, only the years in the valuation that are common to both this dissertation and the 
investment bank report will be compared (2013-2015). 
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that JP Morgan carried out a valuation based on multiples, 
whereas this dissertation aims to value the BMW group through the DCF methodology. We also 
present the multiples valuation but it is important to mention that it was used as a complementary 
valuation of the DCF method and not as a valuation tool on itself. Therefore, it is expected that some 
differences derive from this discrepancy between valuation methods or even arise from the 
operational assumptions or the valuation assumptions. There is no justification for the use of the 
multiples valuation but we can anticipate that it may be related with its simplicity and easier 
interpretation.  
In the Investment Bank report, the defined target price was 85€, which resulted from a revision and 
an upgrade of a previous target price (78€) announced by the analyst. Furthermore, JP Morgan kept 
its “Neutral” recommendation unchanged. The upgrade in the target price was related with the fact 
that JP Morgan had done the same with Daimler estimations, which is one of the strongest peers of 
BMW. Since they both benefit from the profiting in the short term from the improved pricing power 
and they are very close to each other, they can be compared and give similar conclusions. The 
analyst justifies that they expect discounts of BMW to stabilize at lower levels, meaning margins do 
not decline sequentially as much as previously expected. 
The first difference that should be noted is the higher revenues and higher cost of sales that resulted 
from this dissertation, comparing to the investment bank report. The €75,930 Million revenues 
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projected for 2013 by JP Morgan represent a slightly decrease in the revenues from 2012 of 1, 2%. 
This result is not as consistent with the evolution in revenues that the group has been registering. It is 
expected that the pace of growth registered over the last few years will continue during the first years 
of the explicit period. Besides that, the launch of a huge variety of new and innovative models in 
2013 and 2014 is expected to realize a success to the group - BMW eagerly pointed out the launch of 
14 new models in 2013. The BMW group’ core model series – the BMW 3 Series, the BMW 5 
Series and the BMW 7 Series – will be available as full hybrids, which together with the launch of 
the BMW i3, their solution for emissions-free driving in urban areas, will certainly be a success.  
TABLE 14 - BMW GROUP AND JP MORGAN VALUATION COMPARISON (€)  
 
2013 2014E 2015E 
Revenues - dissertation 79 328 033 879,47 81 275 230 056,11 83 106 477 444,59 
Revenues - JP Morgan 75.930.000.000 77.181.000.000 81.322.000.000 
Cost of sales - Dissertation 64 611 925 303,35 65 851 242 915,32 66 875 266 037,20 
Cost of Sales – JP Morgan 60.587.000.000 61.849.000.000 65.417.000.000 
EBIT – Dissertation 6 449 885 451 6 954 860 234 7 571 262 936 
EBIT – JP Morgan 7.951.000.000 7.684.000.000 7.791.000.000 
% EBIT - Dissertation 8,13% 8,56% 9,11% 
% EBIT – JP Morgan 10,50% 10,00% 9,60% 
Financial Result - Dissertation 625 644 319 503 594 482 280 212 821 
Financial Result – JP Morgan 51.000.000 62.000.000 203.000.000 
Pre-tax Income – Dissertation 5 824 241 132 6 451 265 751 7 291 050 114 
Pre-tax Income – JP Morgan 8.012.000.000 7.736.000.000 7.994.000.000 
Net Income - Dissertation 3 784 460 998,37 4 251 787 040,38 4 896 633 680,44 
Net Income – JP Morgan 4.232.000.000 4.267.000.000 4.499.000.000 
Depreciation and Amortization 
– Dissertation 
1 755 399 397,50 1 820 872 554,90 1 888 898 220,64 
Depreciation and Amortization 
– JP Morgan 
3.872.000.000 4.013.000.000 4.147.000.000 
Capital Expenditures – 
Dissertation 
6 346 242 710,36 5 689 266 103,93 5 817 453 421,12 
Capital Expenditures – JP 
Morgan 
6.954.000.000 6.560.000.000 5.693.000.000 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
Moreover, the introduction of those models sets new standards for resource conservation and the use 
of innovative materials, such as carbon fibre, in automobile manufacturing, which is expected to 
increase the cost of sales of the company.  
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Another observed difference was the higher EBIT and EBIT margins reported by JP Morgan. Both 
the results of the investment bank and the results of the dissertation are consistent with the target 
EBIT that the company intends to maintain in the following years. Based on the Strategy Number 
ONE, which was introduced in 2006 for the time period until 2016, a long term EBIT target corridor 
of 8 to 10% is expected. Besides that, EBIT margins followed different paths. While in this 
dissertation an increase in the EBIT margin in the first years is presumed, JP Morgan analyst 
assumes a slight deterioration. Nevertheless, the investor department of the company has clearly 
stated the fact BMW had become more profitable (with double profit before tax between 2007 and 
2012), and expected its EBIT margin to be above the target rate (8%-10%) in 2013 as a result of this 
far above the ground increase in profits. Since in 2012 the EBIT margin was about 10,8%, a higher 
decrease in 2013 was expected to compensate the lower growth in revenues and therefore to be on 
the target range during the explicit period.  
Regarding depreciation and amortization, JP Morgan estimated this figures in a smaller amount than 
the one estimated in this dissertation (40% on average). Nevertheless, there is no indication in the 
investment bank report regarding the assumptions behind these estimations. 
Moreover, the capital expenditures in 2013 were similar between both reports. Nevertheless, in 2014 
JP Morgan expects it to remain at higher levels and therefore decrease in 2015. On the other hand, in 
this dissertation we expected the higher decrease to be noticed between 2013 and 2014. However, as 
stated before, the investor relations department of the firm declared a target 8% CapEx over sales in 
2013 and a 7% CapEx over sales on the remaining years of the explicit period. This was explained 
primarily with the expansion of the production network and the preparations of new models and 
architectures (BMW i & MINI). In addition, development costs will be capitalized for the 
development of new models and product derivatives, new vehicle and engine architectures, and new 
vehicle and drive concepts (e.g. lightweight construction and electric cars). 
In relation with the financial result, it can be seen that JP Morgan expects it to be slower than the one 
presented in this dissertation. However, any guidance in respect of this was made in the report of the 
investment bank. We expect the lower pre-tax income reported in this thesis to be related with that. 
The net income reported by JP Morgan is also larger than the one used in this thesis. Nevertheless, 
the main difference derives from the variance in the estimation of revenues. 
 




The first conclusion to be reached with this thesis is that there is no ideal method or correct valuation 
to carry out. The results depend greatly on the assumptions made and on the initial goal of the 
valuation. Therefore, the crucial part is that the assumptions we make are accurate with the features 
of the company, the characteristics of the environment and of the sector where the company belongs. 
Moreover, the level of information assessment is another key factor in the consistency of the 
valuation. Luckily, we had the great help provided by the investor relations department of BMW 
group that disclosed very useful information and estimations for the forecasting period.  
It was observed that the research reports do not justify their assumptions and consequently it is 
problematic to make a comparison of results with the above-mentioned reports. These misjudged 
assumptions may be the justification for the differences and the inconsistent values found in the 
comparison. 
Regarding the company itself, it was shown that BMW has a strong prospectus and that it has shown 
a strong struggle against the financial crisis and especially, the huge effect that that crisis has had on 
the industry where the company operates. It can be proved with the fact that even in the strongest 
peak of the crisis (2008 and 2009), BMW achieved a positive income and paid interest to its 
shareholders.  Nowadays, BMW is a stronger and more international brand than it was in 2006 (when 
it entered strategy number ONE).  
In order to estimate the market value of the company, which was the purpose of this report, a DCF, 
DDM and multiples methodology were used. These methods were built on forecasts and gave 
different stock values, which is normal since they all reside on different valuations and different 
goals.  The current WACC was estimated to be 5,8%. We computed a 92,1€ price target for the 
company, which represents a 10% upside potential with respect to the stock price at October 17th, 
2013 (the valuation date). This higher price may be related with the different assumptions made and 
maybe the incorporation of different prospectus to the company. On the DDM valuation, the final 
price obtained was 93,4€, which is higher than the price that the group had on the date of the 
valuation, giving force to the idea that the stock is actually undervalued. Moreover, the EV/EBITDA 
multiple valuation resulted on a 94€ price target, which indicates the stock is also undervalued. 
Nevertheless, it was taken less attention to this given the fact that with multiples we’re valuing only 
one specific year and therefore not taking into account the future prospectus of the firm. 
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The undervaluation we found in BMW’s stock price holds even if the growth rate increases 10% in 
relation to the 4,24% used in the valuation. On the other hand, if the growth rate decreases by the 
same percentage, a lower price would be observed than the one observed on the date of the valuation. 
Notwithstanding we consider that the growth rate used is the one that best fits the prospectus of the 
company. We believe that in times like these, uncertainties are very high and changes in the growth 
rate may happen to influence the company’s stock price. On the contrary, we have perceived that the 
company is much more dependent on the WACC changes. Nevertheless, changes in these variables 
are less expected than the ones in the growth rate given the constant capital structure, cost of equity 
and ratings that BMW has registered over the years.   
As stated, the results truly depend on the degree and quality of the assumptions made and therefore 
the quality and accuracy of the valuation also depends on that. We are somehow limited due to the 
restriction and incomplete data, since the thesis was carried out with data from the 3rd quarter of 
2013 and not final data. Whenever possible, the data was updated in order to reflect the highest 
accuracy possible.  
Finally, we strongly believe that BMW has a very strong prospectus and it is a company that is worth 
investing in or analysing. The current undervaluation should be a sign that the market will 









10.1. FORECASTED INCOME STATEMENT FROM 2011 TO 2017 (IN € MILLION) 
 
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Revenues 68821 76848 79328 81275 83106 84938 86660 
Automobiles 63229 70208 73516 75470 77860 80324 82785 
Financial Services 17510 19550 19999 21130 21799 22489 23178 
Motorcycles 1436 1490 1588 1685 1791 1905 2026 
Other Entities 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Reconciliations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eliminations -13359 -14405 -15781 -17017 -18349 -19786 -21335 
Growth 13,8% 11,7% 3,2% 2,5% 2,3% 2,2% 2,0% 
Cost of Sales 54276 61354 64611 65851 66875 67825 68600 
Automobiles 50164 56525 59506 61088 63022 65017 67009 
Financial Services 15013 16984 18490 19535 20154 20792 21429 
Motorcycles 1207 1236 1343 1426 1515 1611 1714 
Other Entities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reconciliations -12108 -13391 -14728 -16198 -17816 -19595 -21552 
Growth 9,5% 13,0% 5,3% 1,9% 1,6% 1,4% 1,1% 
- COGS 50666 57361 60399 61535 62461 63315 63998 
Growth 9,0% 13,2% 5,3% 1,9% 1,5% 1,4% 1,1% 
Gross Profit 14545 15494 14716 15423 16231 17112 18060 
Automobiles 13065 13683 14010 14382 14837 15307 15776 
Financial Services 2497 2566 1509 1594 1645 1697 1749 
Motorcycles 229 254 244 259 275 293 312 
Other Entities 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Reconciliations 12108 13391 14728 16198 17816 19595 21552 
Gross Profit 
Margin 21,1% 20,2% 18,6% 19,0% 19,5% 20,1% 20,8% 
Growth 33,0% 6,5% -5,0% 4,8% 5,2% 5,4% 5,5% 
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 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
- Selling and 
Administrative 
Expenses 
6177 7007 7791 7982 8162 8342 8511 
- Research and 
Development 
Expenses 
3610 3993 4213 4316 4413 4511 4602 
- Other Operating 
Expenses 
1132 1016 1354 1387 1418 1450 1479 
+ Other Operating 
Income 





8018 8300 6450 6955 7571 8262 9030 
Growth 57% 4% -22% 8% 9% 9% 9% 
PBFR Margin 12% 11% 8% 9% 9% 10% 10% 
Amortization and 
Depreciation 
3646 3541 5163 5573 6015 6491 7006 
EBITDA 11664 11841 11613 12528 13586 14753 16036 
Growth 32,7% 1,5% -1,9% 7,9% 8,4% 8,6% 8,7% 
EBITDA margin 16,9% 15,4% 14,6% 15,4% 16,3% 17,4% 18,5% 
EBIT 8018 8300 6450 6955 7571 8262 9030 
Growth 57% 4% -22% 8% 9% 9% 9% 
EBIT margin 12% 11% 8% 9% 9% 10% 10% 
- Interest and 
similar Expense 
943 913 848 746 554 374 296 
Interest and 
similar income 
-763 -753 -688 -742 -807 -881 -963 
Result from Equity 
Accounted 
Investments 
-162 -271 -170 -184 -200 -218 -239 
Other financial 
Result 
617 592 636 683 734 788 846 
Financial Result 635 481 626 504 280 63 -59 
Income before 
Income Taxes 
7383 7819 5824 6451 7291 8199 9089 
Income tax 
expense 
2476 2697 2040 2199 2394 2613 2856 
Tax Rate 30,9% 32,5% 31,6% 31,6% 31,6% 31,6% 31,6% 




2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Net Profit/Loss 4907 5122 3784 4252 4897 5587 6233 
Attributable to 
minority interest 




4881 5096 3758 4226 4871 5561 6207 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
 
10.2. FREE CASH FLOW TO THE FIRM (IN € MILLION) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EBIT 8018 8300 6450 6955 7571 8262 9030 
Tax Rate (%) 30,9% 32,5% 31,6% 31,6% 31,6% 31,6% 31,6% 
-  Taxes on EBIT 2476 2697 2040 2199 2394 2613 2856 
+ Depreciation & 
Amortization 
1578 1613 1755 1821 1889 1960 2033 
+ Provisions (Change) 620 1782 70 191 200 209 219 
- Other non cash items 85 118 488 509 530 552 575 
Income for the Reversal 
of provisions 
71 114 213 223 234 245 256 
Income from the 
reversal of impairment 
losses and write downs 
14 4 275 286 296 307 319 
= Cash Flow from 
Operations 
7655 8880 5747 6258 6735 7266 7851 
- Investment in 
Working Capital 
304 -1559 2766 141 140 144 142 
- Capital Expenditures 3692 5240 6346 5689 5817 5946 6066 
= Free cash Flow from 
operations 
3659 5199 -3365 428 778 1176 1643 
+ Cash flow from non-
operational sources 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
=FCFF 3659 5199 -3365 428 778 1176 1643 
Discounted Cash Flow 
  
-3.364 405 695 992 1.310 
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10.2. DCF VALUATION OUTPUT (IN € MILLION) 
Terminal Value 87 216 380 750 
Sum PV 3 403 309 393 
Enterprise Value 90 619 690 143 
Equity 60 606 462 019 
Debt 30 013 228 124 
Number of shares 658 154 631 
Price 92,1 € 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
 
10.3. EPS CALCULATION (IN € MILLION, EXCEPT FOR PRICES AND EPS) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Dividend Price -  
common stock (€) 
2,30 2,50 2,00 2,25 2,59 2,96 3,30 
Number of shares -
common stock 
601,9 601,9 601,9 601,9 601,9 601,9 601,9 
Total dividends -
common stock (€) 
1 384 1 504 1 206 1 355 1 561 1 781 1 987 
EPS - common 
stock (€) 
7,45 7,77 5,73 6,43 7,41 8,45 9,43 
Dividend Price - 
preferred stock (€) 
2,32 2,52 2,01 2,26 2,60 2,97 3,31 
Number of shares -
preferred stock 
53,5 53,9 54,4 54,8 55,2 55,7 56,2 
Total dividends - 
preferred stock 
124,2 136,0 109,4 123,9 143,8 165,3 185,8 
EPS - preferred 
stock (€) 
7,47 7,79 5,75 6,45 7,43 8,47 9,45 
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10.4. DDM VALUATION OUTPUT 
Terminal Price – Common Equity 82,20 € 
PV terminal price 82,19 € 
Sum PV Dividends 11,15 € 
Total Price - Common Equity 93,35 € 
Terminal Price – Preferred Equity 82,37 € 
PV terminal price 82,37 € 
Sum PV Div 12,35 € 
Total Price - Preferred Equity 94,7 € 
Source: Company reports and own calculations 
 
10.5. BMW’S BONDS OUTSTANDING  
Maturity Date Amount ( € Mln) Interest ( € Mln) 
2013 764 69 
2014 7010 746 
2015 6369 554 
2016 4747 374 
2017 3692 296 
2018 3563 190 
2019 1250 73 
2020 750 33 
2021 0 18 
2022 0 18 
2023 750 18 
Total 28895 2389 
Source: Bloomberg 
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0,613 2,184 3,028 0,613 Centroid I OK 
VOLKSWAGEN AG 1,521 1,646 3,163 1,521 Centroid I OK 
RENAULT SA 0,775 2,328 3,109 0,775 Centroid I OK 
FIAT SPA 2,999 1,891 3,831 1,891 Centroid II OK 
PEUGEOT SA 1,692 3,399 4,567 1,692 Centroid I OK 
HONDA MOTOR CO 
LTD 
2,156 0,595 2,445 0,595 Centroid II OK 
TOYOTA MOTOR 
CORP 
1,751 0,882 2,196 0,882 Centroid II OK 
SUZUKI MOTOR 
CORP 
3,103 2,298 0,991 0,991 Centroid III OK 
GENERAL MOTORS 
CO 
3,524 2,636 3,333 2,636 Centroid II OK 
FORD MOTOR CO 0,888 2,571 3,088 0,888 Centroid I OK 
NISSAN MOTOR CO 
LTD 
0,675 1,883 2,590 0,675 Centroid I OK 
MAZDA MOTOR 
CORP 
2,791 1,885 1,207 1,207 Centroid III OK 




3,982 3,778 1,667 1,667 Centroid III OK 
HYUNDAI MOTOR 
CO 
3,934 3,223 1,559 1,559 Centroid III OK 
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10.7. MULTIPLES VALUATION  
 
2013E 2014E 
Price to Earnings Ratio 63 € 59 € 
EV/EBITDA 94 € 95 € 
EV/EBIT 111 € 98 € 
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and own calculations 
 
10.8. REAL GDP FORECASTS 
GDP Growth (%) 
 
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016-2018E 
Global 2,0 2,5 2,8 2,8 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit  
 
10.9. GDP DEFLACTOR FORECASTS 
                                GDP Deflactor (%)  
  2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2016E 
Eurozone 1,6 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,4 








































10.10. BMW AG RATING HISTORY 
 
Short-term Rating Long-term Rating Outlook 
 
S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's 
2005 A-1 P-1 A+ A1 Stable Stable 
2006 A-1 P-1 A+ A1 Stable Stable 
2007 A-1 P-1 A+ A1 Stable Stable 
2008 A-1 P-1 A A2 Stable Negative 
2009 A-2 P-2 A- A3 Negative Negative 
2010 A-2 P-2 A- A2 Stable Stable 
2011 A-2 P-1 A- A2 Positive Stable 
2012 A-1 P-1 A A2 Stable Stable 
Source: Company’s Reports 
 
10.11. 10-YEAR GERMAN BOND EVOLUTION 
Source: Bloomberg 
 




APV Adjusted Present Value 
CapEx Capital Expenditures 
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CF Cash Flow 
COGS Cost of Goods Sold 
D&A Depreciation and Amortization 
DCF Discounted Cash Flow 
DDM Dividend Discount Model 
DSI Days Sales to Inventory 
DSO Days Sales Outstanding 
DPO Days Payable Outstanding 
DPS Dividend per share 
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
EBITDA 
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation  
and Amortization 
ECF Equity Cash Flow 
EV Enterprise Value 
EVA Economic Value Added 
FCFE Free Cash Flow to the Equity 
FCFF Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
G Growth Rate 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
PER Price to Earnings Ratio 
Rd Return on Debt 
Re Return on Equity 
Rf Risk-Free Rate 
Rm Return on the Market 
PV Present Value 
R&D Research and Development 
S&A Selling and Administrative 
TV Terminal Value 
T Taxes 
VAR Value at Risk 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
YTM Yield to Maturity 
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